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Originally Posted by yaktamer
I know all of this, but the judge's authority to grant a directed verdict of acquittal is limited to cases in which the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for the offense charged. In essence, the judge sits as a "13th" juror. The judge is NOT authorized to enter a directed verdict of acquittal based upon personal disagreement with the law (which is the essence of nullification).
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I'm not sure why you thought otherwise - "contrary to a judge's opinion of the proper decision" means in accordance with law. Trial Judges decide the law. they don't express opinions on any other basis.
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Originally Posted by yaktamer
As far as the Zenger case goes, while it is historically interesting, it predates the adoption of the Consitution by decades, and is effectively of no precedential value.
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Here is one of the first things taught to first year law students - the United States did not adopt a whole new legal system. The United States and the individual states continued the English common law system in effect at the time, except to the extent changed by the Constitution, statutes or specific subsequent common law decision. (Louisiana is the one exception, it chose to go with French civil law instead when it entered the Union.)
The English common law decisions and traditions that pre-date the constitution were (and still are to the extent not otherwise dispensed with) part of our law and traditions. They are not "foreign" law.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly cited the Zenger case for various purposes. for example, in Jones v. US, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) the court referred to the Zenger case in resolving a sentencing issue, stating:
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That this history had to be in the minds of the Framers is beyond cavil. According to one authority, the leading account of Zenger's trial was, with one possible exception "the most widely known source of libertarian thought in England and America during the eighteenth century." L. Levy, Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History 133 (1963). It is just as much beyond question that Americans of the period perfectly well understood the lesson that the jury right could be lost not only by gross denial, but by erosion. See supra, at 17-20. One contributor to the ratification debates, for example, commenting on the jury trial guarantee in Art. III, § 2, echoed Blackstone in warning of the need "to guard with the most jealous circumspection against the introduction of new, and arbitrary methods of trial, which, under a variety of plausible pretenses, may in time, imperceptibly undermine this best preservative of LIBERTY." A [New Hampshire] Farmer, No. 3, June 6, 1788, quoted in The Complete Bill of Rights 477 (N. Cogan ed. 1997).
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