|
06-05-2021, 01:13 PM
|
 |
Member
|
|
|
Join Date: Jan 2011
Location: NM home; Tbilisi work
Posts: 5,238
Likes: 12,006
Liked 11,833 Times in 3,599 Posts
|
|
Quote:
Originally Posted by LVSteve
My take away from the linked piece is that the M2 wasn't a great success and that many soldiers went into spray and pray mode under stress. The latter is hardly a surprise.
|
From page 70: However, there is some illuminating comment. In the approximately 50 infantry actions covered, there were in all 7 witnesses who said that they had fired at an enemy soldier under conditions where there was no doubt the bullet struck him in a vital part of the body, and that he kept on coming. One such witness is 1st Lt. Joseph R. Fisher, 1st Marine Regiment. He was speaking of the defense at Hagaru-ri. The First Marine Division regarded him as one of its ablest and most objective company commanders. These were his words. "About 30 percent of our carbines gave us trouble; some wouldn't fire at at all; some responded sluggishly. But the main reason my men lost confidence in the carbine was because they would put a bullet right in a Chink's chest at 25 yards range and he wouldn't stop. This happened to me. The bullet struck home; the man simply winced and kept on coming. There were about half a dozen of my men made this same complaint; some of them swore they had fired three or four times, hit the man each time, and still not stopped him."
Inaccuracy
Complaint about the inaccuracy of carbine fire was general throughout First Marine Division following the Chosen Reservoir operation. In this action, there was considerable daylight fighting over a period of two weeks against enemy forces moving within moderate distances; these testing conditions do not occur frequently in Korean warfare. Koto-ri, Hagaru-ri, and Udam-ni were all virtually siege operations, with enemy pressing forward around the clock. There was a real opportunity for marksmanship to count. The accuracy of the carbine did not meet the requirements of the situation.
|