Custer's "Last Stand"

[BLACKHAWKNJ]

Custer fought a very poor battle, poor recon, divided his forces in the face of the enemy, not mutually supporting-outnumbered about 5 to 1. He told Reno to "pitch into anything you come across". His final message to Benteen was "Big village, bring packs." The hill where he made his "Last Stand"-poor defensive position. The Indians were superb horsemen. AFAIK no real evidence that the Indians had Winchesters, they were pretty new, ammunition had to be bought from the white men, rather complicated mechanism. They preferred muzzle loaders, easier to load up or down depending on the game, they know how to knap flints

 

[italiansport]

From History Net:

"Not until archaeological investigations were conducted on the battlefield during the 1980s did the extent to which the Indians used gunpowder weapons come to light. Modern firearm identification analysis revealed that the Indians had spoken the truth about the variety and number of weapons they carried. The Cheyenne warrior Wooden Leg went into battle with what he called a’six-shooter’ and later captured a Springfield carbine and 40 rounds of ammunition. The Miniconjou One Bull, Sitting Bull’s nephew, owned an old muzzleloader. The Hunkpapa Iron Hawk and the Cheyenne Big Beaver had only bows and arrows. Eagle Elk, an Oglala, started the battle with a Winchester. White Cow Bull, an Oglala, also claimed to have a repeater.

There were 2,361 cartridges, cases and bullets recovered from the entire battlefield, which reportedly came from 45 different firearms types (including the Army Springfields and Colts, of course) and represented at least 371 individual guns. The evidence indicated that the Indians used Sharps, Smith & Wessons, Evans, Henrys, Winchesters, Remingtons, Ballards, Maynards, Starrs, Spencers, Enfields and Forehand & Wadworths, as well as Colts and Springfields of other calibers. There was evidence of 69 individual Army Springfields on Custer’s Field (the square-mile section where Custer’s five companies died), but there was also evidence of 62 Indian .44-caliber Henry repeaters and 27 Sharps .50-caliber weapons. In all, on Custer’s Field there was evidence of at least 134 Indian firearms versus 81 for the soldiers. It appears that the Army was outgunned as well as outnumbered.

Survivors of the remaining seven companies of the 7th Cavalry asserted that the Indians were equipped with repeating rifles and mentioned Winchesters as often as not. Major Marcus Reno claimed: ‘The Indians had Winchester rifles and the column made a large target for them and they were pumping bullets into it.’ Although some white survivors claimed to be heavily outgunned, Private Charles Windolph of Company H was probably closest to the truth when he estimated that half the warriors carried bows and arrows, one-quarter of them carried a variety of old muzzleloaders and single-shot rifles, and one-quarter carried modern repeaters"

 

[cowart]

I anyone has read what happened to Custers Indian lady and son I would appreciate a reference.

There is considerable doubt about the accuracy of the claim that the "son" was the offspring of Custer. Custer first met Monahseta on November 27, 1868. Her son was born on or close to January 12, 1869. The timing isn't right...

See "Custer Legends" by Lawrence Frost. Page 66.

 

[DWalt]

For what it's worth:

"The Allin System’s performance (note: this refers to the trap door Springfield) in the Indian Wars is much debated. Often cited are the “large number” of empty .45-70 cartridges found at the Battle of the Little Big Horn which exhibited signs of malfunction. Such examples were found, however, they are a small percentage (2.7 – 3.4% by some counts) of the thousands of rounds that were fired in that conflict."

Frasca, Albert J., and Charles R. Suydam. The .45-70 Springfield: Springfield Caliber .58, .50, .45 and .30 Breech Loaders in the U.S. Service, 1865-1893.

 

[Plain Old Dave]

Direct comment: There has been reference made to Custer being able to select repeating rifles. This shows some ignorance of the state of Ordinance in the Victorian era Army; riflery and marksmanship were given no real attention until the 1880s and the situation was such in the Custer era that the targets were made oblong to account for inconsistent long range trajectory of issue ammunition rather than improve the ammunition. Col. Custer's sole choice was what the Ordinance Corps authorized: The Model 1873 Springfield Carbine and the .45 calibre cartridge backed with 50 grains of black powder.

As to the tactical situation, there was only one man in North America that could have come away successfully from the Little Bighorn, and he was in the vicinity of Memphis, Tennessee slowly dying of diabetes: Nathan Bedford Forrest.

 

[DWalt]

About the only repeating rifles that Custer might have been able to get his hands on would have been Spencers, but at that time I'd suspect all of the Army Spencers had probably been sold off as surplus.

 

[Sportsdad60]

Direct comment: There has been reference made to Custer being able to select repeating rifles. This shows some ignorance of the state of Ordinance in the Victorian era Army; riflery and marksmanship were given no real attention until the 1880s and the situation was such in the Custer era that the targets were made oblong to account for inconsistent long range trajectory of issue ammunition rather than improve the ammunition. Col. Custer's sole choice was what the Ordinance Corps authorized: The Model 1873 Springfield Carbine and the .45 calibre cartridge backed with 50 grains of black powder.

As to the tactical situation, there was only one man in North America that could have come away successfully from the Little Bighorn, and he was in the vicinity of Memphis, Tennessee slowly dying of diabetes: Nathan Bedford Forrest.

In the decade preceding, the Army had learned many lessons in the development of small arms. Commercial vendors stepped up to the plate, and the lever-action repeating carbine had proved its rate of fire was a significant advantage in engagements with soldiers armed with single-shot weapons. The troopers of Buford’s Brigades at Gettysburg held the high ground despite being vastly outnumbered by the converging Confederate Army during the first day at Gettysburg at least inpart because of the high rate of fire of their Spencer repeating carbines.

After the war, during the Fetterman Massacre, a small band of U.S. Cavalry troopers were surrounded and slaughtered by a numerically overwhelming force of Native Americans. By the testimony of the arriving units and Native American testimony, two troopers in an enclave of rocks held out until they were out of ammunition. What was the difference between them and the others? Spencer repeating carbines.

So as Custer rode into battle that day in 1876, the other 265 men of the 7th Cavalry must have questioned in their minds why they were forced to carry the Trapdoor Springfield. Some knew, despite their best maintenance efforts (the 7th was known for their maintenance proficiency), their Springfields would fail due to poor ammo. Others knew that even if their rifle worked well, the enemy would fire five shots for every one of theirs, man for man.

Imagine this as you envision their companies rallied together in a skirmish line in the open, surrounded by hostiles. Imagine that if the Army had just given them those blasted commercially available repeaters that could offset this onslaught. Imagine if Army ordnance had not forced the Springfield rifle. Imagine if the asymmetric enemy they were fighting did not have a superior weapon. Imagine if someone who had the power had insisted that the combat-proven repeaters had been issued and that incrementally better arms were kept in the hands of the troops.

There were tactical blunders, too. But imagine a 7th Cavalry with three to five times the firepower it displayed that day. It was plausible, but did not happen. What would history say to us today? What would the outcome be? We do not know, but speculation suggests things may have been different.
Source: General George Custer | US 7th Cavalry | Wrong Rifle?

 

[Ed Fowler]

jag312 and cowart, thanks for the information, been looking for years.
Just ordered the book on Custer Legends.

 

[Plain Old Dave]

About the only repeating rifles that Custer might have been able to get his hands on would have been Spencers, but at that time I'd suspect all of the Army Spencers had probably been sold off as surplus.

If Custer had issued his troopers with arms other than those authorized by the War Department, he would have faced what the Navy calls Relief For Cause for "lack of confidence in his ability to command ". For a second time, and probably permanently.

Sent from my SM-J700T using Tapatalk

 

[BB57]

AFAIK no real evidence that the Indians had Winchesters, they were pretty new, ammunition had to be bought from the white men, rather complicated mechanism. They preferred muzzle loaders, easier to load up or down depending on the game, they know how to knap flints

See Italiansport's post. It's consistent with what I've read in the more modern works (since 1980) regarding the battle.

It's also consistent with the fact that the 1860 Henry had been around for 16 years, 1866 Winchester for 10 years, and the 1873 Winchester for 2 years (since they started shipping in 1874). Still, despite being only 2 years old forensic analysis of firing pin and extractor marks has indicated at least 8 separate 1873s were used by indians at Little Big Horn and 4 were identified being use by the Nz Perce at the much smaller battle of Big Hole in 1877. In both cases they are know to be fired by indians as there were no records of personally owned Winchester 73s with the military units involved, and the cases were found in known indian firing positions.

Over the years, thousands of .44 rimfire cartridges from 1860 Henry rifles are the most numerous cases found at various sites at and around Little Big Horn and it's estimated that there were at least 200 1860 Henry and 1866 Winchester rifles used at LBH based on the recovered cartridge cases.

Obviously, there was a healthy market with indians trading for modern lever action rifles.

The government also provided indians with Sharps .50-70 cartridge conversion on the reservations for hunting purposes, and around 30 of these found there way to LBH for use against Custer's troops.

Interestingly enough there is also definitive forensic cartridge case evidence of Springfield carbines being captured on day 1 of the battle at last stand hill, then being employed against the Reno/Benteen position on day 2. It's harder to prove, but there's little doubt captured rifles were immediately employed against Custer as soon as they were captured.

 

[BB57]

Direct comment: There has been reference made to Custer being able to select repeating rifles. This shows some ignorance of the state of Ordinance in the Victorian era Army; riflery and marksmanship were given no real attention until the 1880s and the situation was such in the Custer era that the targets were made oblong to account for inconsistent long range trajectory of issue ammunition rather than improve the ammunition. Col. Custer's sole choice was what the Ordinance Corps authorized: The Model 1873 Springfield Carbine and the .45 calibre cartridge backed with 50 grains of black powder.

The carbine load at that time used the same 405 grain bullet propelled by a reduced charge of 55 grains of black powder. To take up the extra space a cardboard tube was inserted in the case with the powder then filling the tube under the bullet. At LBH .45-70 cases have been found that still contain the cardboard tube.

In the wake of Little Big Horn, many people were critical of the board that adopted the 1873 Springfield carbine,when repeating carbines were available - but a single shot carbine fit the doctrine of the time.

It was felt that troops would ben wasteful with a repeater - and that attitude didn't die until WWI. You'll note the magazine cut off on the 1903 Springfield - it's there because the doctrine of that time, almost 30 years post Little Big Horn, was that troops should single load rounds and keep the five rounds in the magazine in reserve for the 1903 equivalent of "final protective fire" that was applied to the use of fuel automatic fire in the M16A1 70 years later.

The longer ranged 45-70 also fit the tactical doctrine of the day better, and at the time the repeating carbines available all shot pistol caliber rounds that provided a maximum effective range of around 125 yards in black powder form. In contrast the Sharps Calvary carbine was effective well beyond 200 yards.

The war department also wanted to standardize ammunition and since the .45-70 was the standard infantry rifle there was a substantial incentive for a 45-70 cavalry carbine (and not all that successful given they quickly adopted the lighter carbine load for it).

Training was a major issue at Little Big Horn. A that time there was no basic training - all training was done at the unit level and it was system that didn't work all that well. At LBH, the cavalry troopers almost to the man fought as dismounted infantry and that to a great extent reflects their limited training. Unfortunately, at LBH it also meant they sacrificed the mobility that could have helped them maintain the initiative and disengage successfully.

Marksmanship training took a back seat to conservation of ammunition and as I recall the amount allotted per trooper per year for practice was on the order of 20 rounds. It's likely that more shots were fired by troopers for hunting purposes to put fresh meat on the table, but the total amount of live fire training was woefully inadequate and did not include such advanced skills as firing from horse back, thus reducing the cavalry to mounted infantry using horses to get to the scene of the fight and then dismounting.

 

[Absalom]

We recently discussed the whole battle in another thread, and I'll refrain from laying it all out again, but in summary, there simply is no evidence that any gun or ammunition malfunction contributed to Custer's defeat.

Anecdotal stories about broken-off knife blades and ripped-off cartridge case bottoms, from someone who knew somebody who supposedly found those on the battlefield, have not been confirmed by the archaeological record or by artefacts.

The evidence also shows that the actual "hot phase" of the battle and the collapse of the Custer battalion's position happened in such a short period of time, likely under half an hour and possibly less than 20 minutes, that fouling of black powder arms is very unlikely; stories of fouling from the much longer-lasting Reno-Benteen battle with firing over many hours are irrelevant.

There is also no evidence that ammunition shortages played any role. The volume of ammo that the Custer batallion was able to fire off before annihilation, which in terms of ratios can be reconstructed from the archaeological findings despite the souvenir collectors, does not support that. Custer's troopers didn't have time to fire off the ammo they carried even if they had all stood and fought and had had time to reload once the loss of unit cohesion allowed the warriors to get close.

And there is quite a bit of Indian testimony about collecting almost full cartridge belts from Custer's troopers. As has been mentioned above, a lot of that was later used against the Reno-Benteen position.

 

[jag312]

There is a book I have (someplace?) called With Custer At The Little Bighorn written by one of the troopers under Reno. I believe the author was named Tayler. It gives some good firsthand observations of the battle from the Reno side.

If Reno hadn't attacked first, if Custer had waited for Benteen to arrive, a simultaneous three prong attack might have had a different outcome. Either the Sioux and Cheyenne warriors would have retreated, or the entire 7th Cavalry would have been killed with no survivors. What ifs are fun, aren't they.

 

[Roadtrash]

A lot of really good information here, a lot that I didn't know. That's what I like about this forum, I learn something new just about every day.

 

[rwsmith]

There a lot of reasons.....

...... for what happened but the man reason is the Custer miscalculated just about everything involved in that battle. And the 'Indians' exploited those mistakes. I wonder if Custer had not underestimated the situation so badly if it would have ended differently. Well, what happened happened and second guessing is just for sport.

 

[Cyrano]

Indians fired 13 rounds to 1 fired by the 7th. Troopers went down in a hail of lead.
Carbines didn't have cleaning rods. There were reports of broken knife blades from trying to get stuck cases out found on Custer Hill.

Dr. DeWolf, the regimental surgeon, had the only Springfield rifle and crawled from Trooper to Trooper on Reno hill to clear jammed carbines with his ramrod.

Troopers fired an average of 12 rounds per year in target practice.

I don't know about Custer's carbines, but my trapdoor carbine has a three piece cleaning rod in the buttstock, along with a headless shell extractor.

I also have an empty copper 45-70 case with a notch in the rim that exactly fits the extractor of a trapdoor. Don't know where it came from, but someone had trouble getting that one out of the chamber. The trapdoor has sufficient extracting power, the problem is the extractor is stronger than the copper cases and just tore through the rims.

 

[amazingflapjack]

My impression is that the "Indians" used the human wave tactic that has been employed in later wars; very effectively in the Viet Nam War.

 

[Stainless44]

James Donovan wrote a book titled "A Terrible Glory: Custer and the Little Bighorn - The Last Great Battle of the American West."

It's a very well researched and written book. Easy to read and full of very interesting stuff. Like many others have said, the 7th Cav was fairly inexperienced, many had not even fired a gun from a horse before. Adding to their problems was rampant alcoholism among the officer corps. Some were so drunk they couldn't effectively command their troops during the battle.

You can get a used copy from Amazon starting at under $2. Very much worth the price.

 

[jag312]

I don't know about Custer's carbines, but my trapdoor carbine has a three piece cleaning rod in the buttstock, along with a headless shell extractor.
.

The early ones with the long wrist stock did not have a compartment in the butt and no cleaning rods. I think starting some time in 1877, the stock was changed to include a cleaning rod and shell extractor.

One of my Trapdoor carbines was made in late 1874 and has the long wrist and plain buttplate. It was supposed to have been shipped to the 7th and was at the Little Bighorn, most likely carried by one of the troopers under Benteen or a survivor under Reno. It is in close proximity to numbers of known 7th Cavalry carbines, and the son who was selling his late father's collection is supposed to have the documentation. He'll send it to me when he finds among his father's papers.

 

[Absalom]

My impression is that the "Indians" used the human wave tactic that has been employed in later wars; very effectively in the Viet Nam War.

The main difference being that in later wars with better training, tactics, and weapons, these tactics were successful (if they were) only under horrendous losses for the attackers.

In modern wars these human waves could be employed (and interestingly, also by the Zulu) because the troops attacking into the enemy's guns were ideologically, socially, or otherwise motivated to charge.

The Plains warriors were the very opposite of all that. Every warrior fought when and where and as long as he deemed appropriate.

The evidence indeed supports a "human wave", but a bit different than those fanatical charges by Russian or Japanese troops. Custer's troopers lost their nerve and their unit cohesion, started running, and the Indians charged after them and clobbered them down. The result: disaster for Custer and very low Indian casualties.