For those wondering what "history and text" versus "balancing interests" means, this is a quote from the Justice Thomas' opinion.
As the foregoing shows, Heller’s methodology centered on constitutional text and history. Whether it came to defining
the character of the right (individual or militia dependent),
suggesting the outer limits of the right, or assessing the
constitutionality of a particular regulation, Heller relied on
text and history. It did not invoke any means-end test such
as strict or intermediate scrutiny.
Moreover, Heller and McDonald expressly rejected the
application of any “judge-empowering ‘interest-balancing
inquiry’ that ‘asks whether the statute burdens a protected
interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to
the statute’s salutary effects upon other important governmental interests.’” Heller, 554 U. S., at 634 (quoting id., at
689–690 (BREYER, J., dissenting)); see also McDonald, 561
U. S., at 790–791 (plurality opinion) (the Second Amendment does not permit—let alone require—“judges to assess
the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions” under
means-end scrutiny). We declined to engage in means-end
scrutiny because “[t]he very enumeration of the right takes
out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of
Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis
whether the right is really worth insisting upon.” Heller,
554 U. S., at 634. We then concluded: “A constitutional
guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.” Ibid.
Not only did Heller decline to engage in means-end scrutiny generally, but it also specifically ruled out the intermediate-scrutiny test that respondents and the United States
now urge us to adopt. Dissenting in Heller, JUSTICE
BREYER’s proposed standard—“ask[ing] whether [a] statute
burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is
out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other
important governmental interests,” id., at 689–690 (dissenting opinion)—simply expressed a classic formulation of
intermediate scrutiny in a slightly different way, see Clark
v. Jeter, 486 U. S. 456, 461 (1988) (asking whether the challenged law is “substantially related to an important government objective”). In fact, JUSTICE BREYER all but admitted
that his Heller dissent advocated for intermediate scrutiny
by repeatedly invoking a quintessential intermediate scrutiny precedent. See Heller, 554 U. S., at 690, 696, 704–
705 (citing Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520
U. S. 180 (1997)). Thus, when Heller expressly rejected that
dissent’s “interest-balancing inquiry,” 554 U. S., at 634 (internal quotation marks omitted), it necessarily rejected intermediate scrutiny.
As the foregoing shows, Heller’s methodology centered on constitutional text and history. Whether it came to defining
the character of the right (individual or militia dependent),
suggesting the outer limits of the right, or assessing the
constitutionality of a particular regulation, Heller relied on
text and history. It did not invoke any means-end test such
as strict or intermediate scrutiny.
Moreover, Heller and McDonald expressly rejected the
application of any “judge-empowering ‘interest-balancing
inquiry’ that ‘asks whether the statute burdens a protected
interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to
the statute’s salutary effects upon other important governmental interests.’” Heller, 554 U. S., at 634 (quoting id., at
689–690 (BREYER, J., dissenting)); see also McDonald, 561
U. S., at 790–791 (plurality opinion) (the Second Amendment does not permit—let alone require—“judges to assess
the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions” under
means-end scrutiny). We declined to engage in means-end
scrutiny because “[t]he very enumeration of the right takes
out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of
Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis
whether the right is really worth insisting upon.” Heller,
554 U. S., at 634. We then concluded: “A constitutional
guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.” Ibid.
Not only did Heller decline to engage in means-end scrutiny generally, but it also specifically ruled out the intermediate-scrutiny test that respondents and the United States
now urge us to adopt. Dissenting in Heller, JUSTICE
BREYER’s proposed standard—“ask[ing] whether [a] statute
burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is
out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other
important governmental interests,” id., at 689–690 (dissenting opinion)—simply expressed a classic formulation of
intermediate scrutiny in a slightly different way, see Clark
v. Jeter, 486 U. S. 456, 461 (1988) (asking whether the challenged law is “substantially related to an important government objective”). In fact, JUSTICE BREYER all but admitted
that his Heller dissent advocated for intermediate scrutiny
by repeatedly invoking a quintessential intermediate scrutiny precedent. See Heller, 554 U. S., at 690, 696, 704–
705 (citing Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520
U. S. 180 (1997)). Thus, when Heller expressly rejected that
dissent’s “interest-balancing inquiry,” 554 U. S., at 634 (internal quotation marks omitted), it necessarily rejected intermediate scrutiny.
