[Comments by Cyrano are enclosed in brackets. 1st Lt Ralph P. Buell was the commanding officer of Company C, 107th Infantry Regiment, 27th Infantry Division on September 29, 1918, when the division assaulted the Hindenburg Line. The 27th and 30th Infantry Divisions made up the US 2nd Corps which General Pershing had assigned to the British Army. Their artillery was retained under US control; the remainder of the two divisions went to the 7th British Army under General Gough. The divisions were re-equipped with British uniforms, British kit and British weapons. My father had trained on the Springfield and didn't like the Bitish Mk III SMLE rifles. His diary entry of August 4, 1918, reads "We shot on the range today & I scored pretty good considering I was using the Lee-Enfield rifle". However he was squad leader of a machine gun squad in Company C and they carried the British Lewis Gun instead of the atrocious French Chauchat that equipped the AEF.
This document is a carbon copy of a typewritten original. The pages were stapled to a blue cover in heavier paper. At the end it is annotated in ink "Lt Ralph Buell's Statement"; since he was gravely wounded on Sept 29, this document must have been written when he had sufficiently recovered. The purpose of this document; and how my father, a corporal at the time, obtained a copy, are unknown.]
On the 29th of September, 1918, I was in command of "C" Company, 107th Infantry, A.E.F., and was the only officer present with the company, my platoons being each commanded by a sergeant.
Pursuant to orders of the Battalion Commander, my Company was to take off at 5:50 A.M, as the left flank company of the first wave, cover a front of four hundred yards and connecting with 'B" company of our Battalion on the right . "C" Company was therefore the left flank company of the regiment and of the 2nd Corps, A.E. F.
By like orders, I formed my Company for the attack as follows: 2 platoons in first line, a single line of skirmishers at intervals of about 9 yards and 2 platoons in line of combat groups in support, and at a distance of 25 yards from the first line: company headquarters in center of the company, 10 yards in the rear of the first line.
The direction of the attack was given as 85 degrees magnetic. The commanding officer of "B" Company [1st Lt Samuel Crump, Jr, KIA on Sept 29th. The other two officers of B Company were wounded.] was directed to have a detail march on his right flank with a compass to keep this bearing and I was directed to have a similiar detail on my left flank. "B" Company was directed to guide right and "C" Company was to guide left.
My information was that a liaison company from the 54th Brigade, B.E.F., was to advance, keeping in touch with my left, and that several tanks were to advance on my left as further support. As a result of a reconaissance by the Commanding Officer of "B" Company and myself on the 28th, and a discussion of the situation, we reached the conclusion that this liaison company would not make contact with me; that the tanks might not get up, and that therefore my comany would sag off to the left, leaving a gap between"B" and"C", and which was particularly important to avoid, by reason of the obstacles in our front. [He was correct; a gap of about 1/2 mile opened between Company C and the B.E.F. on their left as the Americans advanced; and no tanks put in an appearance.]
We accordingly agreed that his left support platoon would take care of such a gap, my right platoon would watch my center which would strike the worst part of the 'knoll", [a topographical feature that was one of their objectives] and my left support platoon would watch my left flank and fill in the line if it thinned out too much or form a defensive flank if necessary.
As I expected to have to go to the left to keep things moving there, I instructed my non-coms not to guide on me in any event or to stop if I stopped but to follow the order I had given to guide left on the general line. We jumped off the tape at zero hour and went at a fast walk to catch up with the barrage, which came down about 1,000 yards ahead of us [BIG mistake on the part of the Divison Commander; the barrage should have come down directly in front of the tape. A lot of soldiers died as a result of this mistake]. After we had gone about 200 yards, I ran into two Germans in a sunken road, took them prisoners and sent them to the rear. As I had to threaten to shoot one of them, who showed fight, I necessarily stopped for perhaps a minute and then I noticed that the men n my vicinity, regardless of my instructions, were stopping too, and that the line was regulating its pace on me. This became apparent because when I started forward, they started as well. After another short advance, I stopped to look around and the same thing happened. I then realized that in order to keep the line going ahead, I would have to lead it; so I turned over my company hadaquarters to the 1st Sergeant, telling him to keep them in the designated position, and went out ahead of the company, waving them to come on.
[Continued in next post.]
This document is a carbon copy of a typewritten original. The pages were stapled to a blue cover in heavier paper. At the end it is annotated in ink "Lt Ralph Buell's Statement"; since he was gravely wounded on Sept 29, this document must have been written when he had sufficiently recovered. The purpose of this document; and how my father, a corporal at the time, obtained a copy, are unknown.]
On the 29th of September, 1918, I was in command of "C" Company, 107th Infantry, A.E.F., and was the only officer present with the company, my platoons being each commanded by a sergeant.
Pursuant to orders of the Battalion Commander, my Company was to take off at 5:50 A.M, as the left flank company of the first wave, cover a front of four hundred yards and connecting with 'B" company of our Battalion on the right . "C" Company was therefore the left flank company of the regiment and of the 2nd Corps, A.E. F.
By like orders, I formed my Company for the attack as follows: 2 platoons in first line, a single line of skirmishers at intervals of about 9 yards and 2 platoons in line of combat groups in support, and at a distance of 25 yards from the first line: company headquarters in center of the company, 10 yards in the rear of the first line.
The direction of the attack was given as 85 degrees magnetic. The commanding officer of "B" Company [1st Lt Samuel Crump, Jr, KIA on Sept 29th. The other two officers of B Company were wounded.] was directed to have a detail march on his right flank with a compass to keep this bearing and I was directed to have a similiar detail on my left flank. "B" Company was directed to guide right and "C" Company was to guide left.
My information was that a liaison company from the 54th Brigade, B.E.F., was to advance, keeping in touch with my left, and that several tanks were to advance on my left as further support. As a result of a reconaissance by the Commanding Officer of "B" Company and myself on the 28th, and a discussion of the situation, we reached the conclusion that this liaison company would not make contact with me; that the tanks might not get up, and that therefore my comany would sag off to the left, leaving a gap between"B" and"C", and which was particularly important to avoid, by reason of the obstacles in our front. [He was correct; a gap of about 1/2 mile opened between Company C and the B.E.F. on their left as the Americans advanced; and no tanks put in an appearance.]
We accordingly agreed that his left support platoon would take care of such a gap, my right platoon would watch my center which would strike the worst part of the 'knoll", [a topographical feature that was one of their objectives] and my left support platoon would watch my left flank and fill in the line if it thinned out too much or form a defensive flank if necessary.
As I expected to have to go to the left to keep things moving there, I instructed my non-coms not to guide on me in any event or to stop if I stopped but to follow the order I had given to guide left on the general line. We jumped off the tape at zero hour and went at a fast walk to catch up with the barrage, which came down about 1,000 yards ahead of us [BIG mistake on the part of the Divison Commander; the barrage should have come down directly in front of the tape. A lot of soldiers died as a result of this mistake]. After we had gone about 200 yards, I ran into two Germans in a sunken road, took them prisoners and sent them to the rear. As I had to threaten to shoot one of them, who showed fight, I necessarily stopped for perhaps a minute and then I noticed that the men n my vicinity, regardless of my instructions, were stopping too, and that the line was regulating its pace on me. This became apparent because when I started forward, they started as well. After another short advance, I stopped to look around and the same thing happened. I then realized that in order to keep the line going ahead, I would have to lead it; so I turned over my company hadaquarters to the 1st Sergeant, telling him to keep them in the designated position, and went out ahead of the company, waving them to come on.
[Continued in next post.]
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