NAVAL CATASTROPHE

[OLDNAVYMCPO]

On May 7, 1942, prior to the two opposing fleets engaging in what became known as the Battle of the Coral Sea, catastrophe struck two U.S. Navy ships.

Not aware of each other's exact location, direction or speed, the commander of the Japanese fleet of two large A/C carriers, a small carrier, eight cruisers and twelve destroyers, Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi, sent out two search planes.

Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher had just completed his refueling, under way, of the two A/C carriers under his command, the USS Lexington and The USS Yorktown. The fleet oiler Neosho and it's destroyer escort, Sims, departed with plans to rendezvous again at a later date.

The two Jap search planes found and mistakenly identified the two US ships as an A/C carrier and a cruiser. Takagi immediately ordered more than 60 A/C to the attack.

The Sims was the first to be hit. Three 500 pound bombs lifted her completely out of the water. In the ensuing explosion only 15 of her crew of 250 survived.

The oiler, Neosho was hit, aflame and listing. When it's skipper ordered the crew to prepare to abandon ship, many crewmembers immediately leaped over the side, having just witnessed the Sims' explosion. Many returned to their ship, others drifted away on life rafts where they drifted for ten days, most dying.

To make matters worse, the Neosho's navigator reported the ship's location, hundreds of miles from it's real coordinates.

This was only the beginning of the miscalculations that plagued both fleets in the opening round of the Battle of the Coral Sea.

 

[Ivan the Butcher]

I think that rascal Murphy, invented the fog of war!

Ivan

 

[Dennis The B]

While the Battle of The Coral Sea was a tactical victory for the Japanese (the U.S. lost more ships), it proved to be a strategic disaster. The Japanese had expected to bolster their Army in anticipation of an invasion of Australia. However, the delay caused by their carrier losses, destroyed their timetable, and allowed the U.S. to gather critical breathing space.

The real heroism lies after the battle. USS Yorktown, while critically damaged, got to Pearl Harbor, where dockyard crews turned her around in time to participate at the Battle of Midway.

I agree with the fog of war, and the unnecessary loss of life, but the fog never changes. The Japanese suffered from the fog at Midway, Halsey during the typhoons, and again the Japanese with their campaign of Kamikaze attacks. Those wasted pilots in idiotic one-way missions when the Japanese already suffered from a shortage of pilots.

 

[shouldazagged]

I think that rascal Murphy, invented the fog of war!

Ivan

Murphy was an optimist.

Thanks, Master Chief, I didn't know that tragic story.

 

[jeffsmith]

Allied Naval forces in the Pacific Suffered Several Defeats
in the Time between Dec 41 & June 42

Among the lesser known are the Sinking of
HMS Repulse & HMS Prince of Wales Dec 10
USS Langley (CV-1) our first Aircraft Carrier Feb 27
USS Houston (CA-30) March 1

The US Victory in early June has righty been called "Miracle at Midway"

 

[AKtinman]

The story of the Sims and Neosho are told in the book "The Ship That Wouldn't Die" by Don Keith.

Quite an interesting read about a little-known bit of history.

Thanks for bringing this up, Master Chief.

 

[Cardboard_killer]

The Neosho was an very valuable ship, more important in 1942 than a battleship as it was one of three (IIRC) fleet oilers available until September of that year. Without the fleet oilers, the Pacific fleet would have been hobbled.

 

[vigil617]

Thanks for the story, Master Chief.

Not the last time the Japanese would misinterpret ships as aircraft carriers and cruisers when they were smaller craft. In the epic Battle off Samar in 1944, a large Japanese force mistook U.S. baby flat tops and destroyers guarding the Leyte landings there the same way, and broke off attack after sinking several of them. If they had known what they actually were facing -- the bulk of the U.S. force had sailed away days before -- it would have been a disaster for the ships and the troops on the beach.

 

[OLDNAVYMCPO]

The most significant accomplishment for the American forces was that with the sinking of the small Jap carrier Shoto, Takagi became so unhinged that he turned back the 14 troop transports that had been destined to attack Port Moresby, New Guinea. As a result, Port Moresby never did fall to the Japs.

 

[Dennis The B]

Thanks for the story, Master Chief.

Not the last time the Japanese would misinterpret ships as aircraft carriers and cruisers when they were smaller craft. In the epic Battle off Samar in 1944, a large Japanese force mistook U.S. baby flat tops and destroyers guarding the Leyte landings there the same way, and broke off attack after sinking several of them. If they had known what they actually were facing -- the bulk of the U.S. force had sailed away days before -- it would have been a disaster for the ships and the troops on the beach.

The story of Taffy Three is one of exemplary heroism by a force which, by all accords, should have been wiped out without a second thought by Kurita's "Center Force"

USS Johnston (DD557), captained by Commander Ernest Evans, sailed into the face of Kurita's cruisers, and fought with such ferocity, that Kurita eventually turned around his force and moved north. When Johnston was commissioned, Captain Evans stated:

This is going to be a fighting ship. I intend to go in harm's way, and anyone who doesn't want to go along had better get off right now."

The Escort carriers also launched unarmed aircraft to attract fire from the cruisers to allow the destroyers to maneuver and fire torpedos at Kurita's force. Johnston was sunk, and Captain Evans died afterward. Because of fears of Japanese submarines, it was several days before crewmen were rescued from the battle area. Captain Evans was posthumously awarded The Medal of Honor.

We've discussed the "fog of war" and this battle off Samar, is certainly a prime example. Kurita turned and fled, thinking that Taffy 3 was a much more potent force. But the real fog was in the mind of Admiral Halsey. His orders specifically said to support the landings. Instead, he got wind of Ozawa's carriers being in range of attack. Seizing this opportunity caused Halsey to abandon the landing support, and go off on "Bull's Run". Admiral Nimitz even signaled Halsey, asking him where his task force really was. Halsey never did catch the carriers, and was later chastened by Nimitz for his actions.

 

[BLACKHAWKNJ]

The US Navy had a rather steep learning curve in the first 10 months of the Pacific War-look at the beating they took at Savo Island.

 

[fordson]

Master Chief - Thanks for posting. I always enjoy your tid bits of history as they re-spark my own interests and send me scurrying to my in-house "library". I had an old history prof who once told me that history was never wrong as you always knew the ending. Thanks again.

 

[Dennis The B]

The US Navy had a rather steep learning curve in the first 10 months of the Pacific War-look at the beating they took at Savo Island.

They also suffered from a lack of tactical leadership. Admiral Ghormley, who commanded the Southern Pacific Fleet, hadn't been to sea since 1938, and he wasn't Admiral Nimitz's first choice. The politics of the Navy Department kept the Washington command structure at odds with the Pacific command. Admiral Ghormley had no experience with Naval air operations, and this was probably not his only shortcoming.

The Navy also gave short shrift to the Japanese. The Japanese fleet was allegedly poor at night fighting, yet our own Navy was ill-prepared for surface warfare.

After Midway, we were short carriers and planes. So, Admiral Ghormley decided to keep USS Enterprise away from Guadalcanal lest she be lost to Japanese submarines or aircraft from island airbases.

While Savo Island is the worst example, there was plenty of blame to go around to all surface commanders.

The other major problem was Washington's lack of faith in the intelligence command at Pearl Harbor. The folks there were far ahead of Washington in decoding the Japanese naval code, even after it was changed in mid-1942. It was just one more example of the lumbering bureaucracy in Washington, and the jealousy of the staff there. Commander Rochefort should have immediately been promoted to Captain, and put in charge of all intelligence for Pacific Operations, yet he wasn't even recognized for his efforts until after his death years later.

 

[OLDNAVYMCPO]

Dennis The B, you are exactly correct in your last paragraph. To interpret the Jap codes, it was not a matter of word for word translation. That was not possible, one had to understand the culture and read into the intent or hidden meaning. In that respect, Hawaii had it all over Washington.

 

[Dennis The B]

Dennis The B, you are exactly correct in your last paragraph. To interpret the Jap codes, it was not a matter of word for word translation. That was not possible, one had to understand the culture and read into the intent or hidden meaning. In that respect, Hawaii had it all over Washington.

You bet, Master Chief! Commander Rochefort, and his mentor Commander Laurence Safford, both spent years in the Far East, learning Japanese culture and language.

JN25 was a very difficult code, as you mentioned, and the intelligence folks needed to understand the Japanese people, in order to understand how the code operated. There was an actual conspiracy in Washington by two brothers who were in Naval Intelligence, to discredit the Hypo Station's results.

While the movie "Midway" didn't really tell how Station Hypo really worked, it did get across the idea that it was intelligence that wins the day.

 

[Dave_n]

There was also the stratagem originating from either Rochefort or Safford of sending what was effectively an "en clair" signal that Midway Island was short of water. This enabled the Codebreakers to confirm that Midway was the main target of the June 42 attack by the IJN by identifying the JN25 codes for Midway Island.

On another point, a major problem in the USN submarine service in 1942 was the total inability to show/accept that US torpedoes were running deep and that magnetic exploders were not working. I think it took over a year for the Naval Ordnance department to admit they were wrong, due to politics in Washington. A similar thing happened to the Kreigsmarine in 1939-40 when German torpedoes suffered from a similar series of defects. Dave_n

 

[BLACKHAWKNJ]

In 1942 the US Navy had its first surface ship to surface ship combat since 1898.