The Battle of the Coral Sea

Register to hide this ad
Forget the Battle of the Coral Sea???????

No way. But with so many important events during that time sometimes we need a reminder. Since you brought it up I'm going to do one of my 'mini studies' and look thoroughly at the details.
 
I remember reading about this battle--many times. Thank you for posting about it.

Battle_of_the_Coral_Sea_Preparations_1500wd.gif

71380-004-B4724C34.jpg

Midway.jpg

USA-P-Papua-p47.jpg

You Navy guys put up one hell of a fight.
coral-sea-lexington.jpg

Planes%20landing%20on%20USS%20Lexington%20during%20Battle%20of%20Coral%20Sea.jpg

g16802.jpg
 
Last edited:
Please do. I posted this because I know that there are a lot of other history geeks on the forum. I hoped to start a discussion.



No way. But with so many important events during that time sometimes we need a reminder. Since you brought it up I'm going to do one of my 'mini studies' and look thoroughly at the details.
 
As Winston Churchill said about a battle several months later, "This is not the end. Nor is it the beginning of the end. It is, perhaps, the end of the beginning."

There was a lot of war ahead, but this one proved that the Japanese were not invincible.

Could well have been the turning point. Battle of the Philippine Sea is another crucial battle.
 
Battle of the Philippine Sea is another crucial battle.
I'm a big fan of Raymond Spruance, who led the US naval force at the Battle of the Philippine Sea (aka The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot), and it was an victory for the US. . . but, it was a case where the US performed okay operationally while the Japanese performed brilliantly operationally; but the difference in pilot skill level (mostly) and plane superiority won the day.

The Japanese played the game perfectly, but then their under-trained pilots flying planes that were a generation behind ran into a buzz saw of well trained veteran US pilots in F6Fs vectored in by air controllers using radar to its best effect. Basically, the game was over for the Japanese by June of 1944.

It was a battle the US almost couldn't lose. And afterwards, the Japanese withdrew with most of their fleet intact (but without any planes left!). Spruance got slammed by some for allowing it to escape, but he stayed with the invasion fleet because that was the job at hand, unlike Halsey a few months later at the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

Now Coral Sea was a gamble. The US won a hard fought battle with mostly even odds, and paid dearly for it. The pilots that went into that battle faced long odds and knew it.
 
Like so many instances during WWII, we came so close to losing it. Call it divine intervention, shear good fortune or whatever, most people don't realize just how close we came to losing. If only a very few small things had happened differently. If the code breakers hadn't figured out the Jap code for Midway, if someone on Hitler's staff had had the cojones to wake his sorry butt up during the Normandy invasion, if the scout planes hadn't spotted the Jap fleet, and on and on. But then that is how war is.
 
As Winston Churchill said about a battle several months later, "This is not the end. Nor is it the beginning of the end. It is, perhaps, the end of the beginning."

...
He said that about Montgomery's victory over Rommel at El Alamein.
 
I served on the USS Johnston (DDD821) which was named after the USS Johnston (DD557). 557 was instrumental in protecting the landing force at the Coral Sea. For more details of the heroic action of the 557 before she was sunk in battle search "Taffy 3".

Three destroyers and four smaller destroyer escorts had been tasked to protect the escort carriers from aircraft and submarines. The three Fletcher-class destroyers—affectionately nicknamed "tin cans" because they lacked armor—were fast enough to keep up with a fast carrier task force. Each had five single 5 in (127 mm) guns and light antiaircraft guns which were not designed to take on armored warships. Only their ten 21 in (530 mm) Mark-15 torpedoes—housed in two swiveling five-tube launchers amidships—posed a serious threat to battleships and cruisers. Destroyer escorts like Samuel B. Roberts were even smaller and slower, since they had been designed to protect slow freighter convoys against submarines.

After laying down smoke to hide the carriers from Japanese gunners, they were soon making desperate torpedo runs. The ship profiles and aggressiveness caused the Japanese to think they were cruisers and full-sized destroyers. Their lack of armor tended to aid clean penetration of armor-piercing rounds before Japanese gunners switched to high-explosive (HE) shells, which caused much more extensive damage. Their speed and agility enabled some ships to dodge shellfire completely before launching torpedoes. Effective damage control and redundancy in propulsion and power systems kept them running and fighting even after absorbing dozens of hits before sinking, although the decks would be littered with the dead and seriously wounded.

USS Johnston (DD557)

At 0700, Commander Ernest E. Evans (half Cherokee and one quarter Creek) of the destroyer Johnston, in response to incoming shell fire bracketing carriers of the group he was escorting, began laying down a protective smokescreen and zigzagging. At about 0710, Gunnery Officer Robert Hagen began firing at the closest attackers, then at a range of 18,000 yards (16,000 m) and registered several hits on the leading heavy cruisers. The Japanese targeted Johnston and soon shell splashes were bracketing the ship. In response and without consulting with his commanders, Evans ordered Johnston to "flank speed, full left rudder", beginning an action that would earn him the Medal of Honor. Johnston, still making smoke and zigzagging, accelerated to flank speed towards the Japanese.

Johnston pressed its attack, firing more than two hundred shells as it followed an evasive course through moderate swells, making it a difficult target. Johnston closed to within maximum torpedo range, and at 9,000 yards (8,200 m) she fired a full salvo of ten torpedoes.[11] At 0724, two or three struck, blowing the bow off Kumano. Minutes later, at 0733, Kongō was forced to turn away north to avoid four torpedoes. The heavy cruiser Suzuya, suffering damage from air attacks, was also taken out of the fight, as she stopped to assist Kumano. The effect of Johnston's attack was to generate confusion in the minds of the Japanese commanders, who thought they were being engaged by American cruisers. Evans then reversed course and, under cover of his smoke screen, opened the range between his ship and the enemy.

At 0730, three 14 in (360 mm) shells from the battleship Kongō, at a range of 7 nmi (8.1 mi; 13 km), passed through the deck of Johnston and into her portside engine room, cutting the destroyer's speed in half to 17 kn (20 mph; 31 km/h) and disrupting electric power to her aft gun mounts. Moments later, three 6 in (150 mm) shells — possibly from Yamato — struck Johnston's bridge, causing numerous casualties and severing the fingers of Commander Evans's left hand. The ship was mangled badly, with dead and dying sailors strewn across her bloody decks—but Johnston did not sink. Her stores of fuel had been seriously depleted before the battle, saving her from a catastrophic explosion. The ship found sanctuary in rain squalls, where the crew had time to repair damage, restoring power to two of the three aft gun mounts. Johnston's search radar was destroyed, toppled to the deck in a tangled mess. The fire control radar was damaged, but was quickly returned to service. Only a few minutes were required to bring Johnston's main battery and radar online, and from its hidden position in the rain, Johnston fired several dozen rounds at a destroyer leader at 10,000 yards (9,100 m) (beginning at approximately 0735). Fire was then shifted to the cruisers approaching from the east. Several dozen more rounds were fired at the closest target at 11,000 yards (10,000 m).

As Johnston continued its course away from the Japanese, it came upon the charging screening force, led by the damaged Hoel. Evans then had Johnston rejoin the attack to provide gun support to Commander Thomas' small squadron on their torpedo run. Attacking Tone, the leading heavy cruiser to the east of the formation, Johnston closed to 6,000 yards (5,500 m), now firing with reduced efficiency due to her lost SC radar, yet still registering many hits.

During the battle, Evans engaged in several duels with much larger Japanese opponents. At 0820, emerging through smoke and rain squalls, Johnston was confronted by Kongō, a 36,600-ton battleship. Johnston fired at least 40 rounds, and more than 15 hits on the battleship's superstructure were observed. Johnston reversed course and disappeared in the smoke, avoiding Kongō's 14-inch return fire. Responding at 0830, Johnston bore down on a huge cruiser firing at the helpless Gambier Bay, then closed to 6,000 yards (5,500 m) and fired for ten minutes at a heavier and better-armed opponent, possibly Haguro, scoring numerous hits.

At 0840, a much more pressing target appeared astern. A formation of seven Japanese destroyers in two columns was closing in to attack the carriers. Reversing course to intercept, Evans attempted to pass in front of the formation, crossing the "T", a classical naval maneuver which would have put the force being "crossed" at a great disadvantage. Evans ordered Johnston's guns to fire on this new threat. The Japanese destroyers returned fire, striking Johnston several times. Perhaps seeing his disadvantage, the commander of the lead destroyer turned away to the west. From as close as 7,000 yards (6,400 m), Hagen fired and scored a dozen hits on the destroyer leader before it veered off. He shifted fire to the next destroyer in line, scoring five hits before it too turned away. Amazingly, the entire squadron turned west to avoid Johnston's fire. At 0920, these destroyers finally managed to fire their torpedoes from extreme range, 10,500 yd (9,600 m). Several torpedoes were detonated by strafing aircraft or defensive fire from the carriers, and the rest failed to strike a target.

Now the Japanese and American ships were intertwined in a confused jumble. Gambier Bay and Hoel were sinking. Finding targets was not difficult. After 0900, with Hoel and Samuel B. Roberts out of the fight, the crippled Johnston was an easy target. Fighting with all she had, she exchanged fire with four cruisers and numerous destroyers.

Johnston continued to take hits from the Japanese, which knocked out the number one gun mount, killing many men. By 0920, forced from the bridge by exploding ammunition, Evans was commanding the ship from the stern by shouting orders down to men manually operating the rudder. Shell fire knocked out the remaining engine, leaving Johnston dead in the water at 0940. As her attackers gathered around the vulnerable ship, they concentrated fire on her rather than the fleeing carriers. Johnston was hit so many times that one survivor recalled "they couldn't patch holes fast enough to keep her afloat."

At 0945, Evans finally gave the order to abandon ship. Johnston sank 25 minutes later with 186 of her crew. Evans abandoned ship with his crew, but was never seen again. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. However, it was the Japanese themselves who first recognized Johnston's incredible actions that day: As a Japanese destroyer cruised slowly by, Robert Billie and several other crewmen watched as her captain saluted the sinking Johnston.
--
Roger
 
A large part of the reason the Japanese had so few well trained pilots was a result of Midway and the Coral Sea. Japanese doctrine dictated that pilots stayed in combat as long as they could fly. That meant that experienced pilots were not regularly rotated back to the home islands to train new pilots.

At both battles, the Japanese lost much of their cadre of experienced pilots. A Pearl Harbor most of pilots were experienced as the Japanese had been at war in China, French Indochina, and other countries since 1937 or so.

Most of those pilots were still flying combat at Midway and the Coral Sea. Many of them were lost and their experience was lost with them.

The US, OTOH, had a doctrine of rotating pilots back home at various intervals to train new pilots and share their combat experience.

By the time of the later battles, the USN and USMC had not only better airplanes, they had better pilots.

I'm a big fan of Raymond Spruance, who led the US naval force at the Battle of the Philippine Sea (aka The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot), and it was an victory for the US. . . but, it was a case where the US performed okay operationally while the Japanese performed brilliantly operationally; but the difference in pilot skill level (mostly) and plane superiority won the day.

The Japanese played the game perfectly, but then their under-trained pilots flying planes that were a generation behind ran into a buzz saw of well trained veteran US pilots in F6Fs vectored in by air controllers using radar to its best effect. Basically, the game was over for the Japanese by June of 1944.

It was a battle the US almost couldn't lose. And afterwards, the Japanese withdrew with most of their fleet intact (but without any planes left!). Spruance got slammed by some for allowing it to escape, but he stayed with the invasion fleet because that was the job at hand, unlike Halsey a few months later at the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

Now Coral Sea was a gamble. The US won a hard fought battle with mostly even odds, and paid dearly for it. The pilots that went into that battle faced long odds and knew it.
 
Recommend "The Last of the Tin Can Sailors" by James Hornfischer for a detailed account of Taffy 3 battle.
The best account on Midway and its lead up at Coral Sea is "Shattered Sword" Parshall and Tully. Very detailed account on how the Pacific war entered a new phase at 1026 hrs on 4 June 1942 when Lt. Richard Best's three plane element attacked the Akagi. "Pacific Crucible" by Ian Toll and "Neptunes Inferno" by Hornfischer are good for the early Naval engagements up to Guadalcanal.
Eric Bergerud's "Fire in a the Sky" and "Touched with Fire" and Ronald Spector's "At War at Sea" and "Eagle Against the Sun" are worth reading for views on the air and sea wars of the PTO.

Along with the Japanese loss of experienced flight crews, as was pointed out above, was the loss of experienced techs, aircraft and engine mechanics.
 
Last edited:
A question on my test for E8 was "What was the first naval battle where neater sides ships saw each other?"
Being a history buff I know it was the battle of Midway.
Outnumbered U.S. Pacific Fleet succeeded in destroying four Japanese aircraft carriers with the loss of only one of its own, the Yorktown.

Some worthless knowledge, but I did make SCPO in 1972.... :)
 
I served on the USS Johnston (DDD821) which was named after the USS Johnston (DD557). 557 was instrumental in protecting the landing force at the Coral Sea. For more details of the heroic action of the 557 before she was sunk in battle search "Taffy 3".

Three destroyers and four smaller destroyer escorts had been tasked to protect the escort carriers from aircraft and submarines. The three Fletcher-class destroyers—affectionately nicknamed "tin cans" because they lacked armor—were fast enough to keep up with a fast carrier task force. Each had five single 5 in (127 mm) guns and light antiaircraft guns which were not designed to take on armored warships. Only their ten 21 in (530 mm) Mark-15 torpedoes—housed in two swiveling five-tube launchers amidships—posed a serious threat to battleships and cruisers. Destroyer escorts like Samuel B. Roberts were even smaller and slower, since they had been designed to protect slow freighter convoys against submarines.

After laying down smoke to hide the carriers from Japanese gunners, they were soon making desperate torpedo runs. The ship profiles and aggressiveness caused the Japanese to think they were cruisers and full-sized destroyers. Their lack of armor tended to aid clean penetration of armor-piercing rounds before Japanese gunners switched to high-explosive (HE) shells, which caused much more extensive damage. Their speed and agility enabled some ships to dodge shellfire completely before launching torpedoes. Effective damage control and redundancy in propulsion and power systems kept them running and fighting even after absorbing dozens of hits before sinking, although the decks would be littered with the dead and seriously wounded.

USS Johnston (DD557)

At 0700, Commander Ernest E. Evans (half Cherokee and one quarter Creek) of the destroyer Johnston, in response to incoming shell fire bracketing carriers of the group he was escorting, began laying down a protective smokescreen and zigzagging. At about 0710, Gunnery Officer Robert Hagen began firing at the closest attackers, then at a range of 18,000 yards (16,000 m) and registered several hits on the leading heavy cruisers. The Japanese targeted Johnston and soon shell splashes were bracketing the ship. In response and without consulting with his commanders, Evans ordered Johnston to "flank speed, full left rudder", beginning an action that would earn him the Medal of Honor. Johnston, still making smoke and zigzagging, accelerated to flank speed towards the Japanese.

Johnston pressed its attack, firing more than two hundred shells as it followed an evasive course through moderate swells, making it a difficult target. Johnston closed to within maximum torpedo range, and at 9,000 yards (8,200 m) she fired a full salvo of ten torpedoes.[11] At 0724, two or three struck, blowing the bow off Kumano. Minutes later, at 0733, Kongō was forced to turn away north to avoid four torpedoes. The heavy cruiser Suzuya, suffering damage from air attacks, was also taken out of the fight, as she stopped to assist Kumano. The effect of Johnston's attack was to generate confusion in the minds of the Japanese commanders, who thought they were being engaged by American cruisers. Evans then reversed course and, under cover of his smoke screen, opened the range between his ship and the enemy.

At 0730, three 14 in (360 mm) shells from the battleship Kongō, at a range of 7 nmi (8.1 mi; 13 km), passed through the deck of Johnston and into her portside engine room, cutting the destroyer's speed in half to 17 kn (20 mph; 31 km/h) and disrupting electric power to her aft gun mounts. Moments later, three 6 in (150 mm) shells — possibly from Yamato — struck Johnston's bridge, causing numerous casualties and severing the fingers of Commander Evans's left hand. The ship was mangled badly, with dead and dying sailors strewn across her bloody decks—but Johnston did not sink. Her stores of fuel had been seriously depleted before the battle, saving her from a catastrophic explosion. The ship found sanctuary in rain squalls, where the crew had time to repair damage, restoring power to two of the three aft gun mounts. Johnston's search radar was destroyed, toppled to the deck in a tangled mess. The fire control radar was damaged, but was quickly returned to service. Only a few minutes were required to bring Johnston's main battery and radar online, and from its hidden position in the rain, Johnston fired several dozen rounds at a destroyer leader at 10,000 yards (9,100 m) (beginning at approximately 0735). Fire was then shifted to the cruisers approaching from the east. Several dozen more rounds were fired at the closest target at 11,000 yards (10,000 m).

As Johnston continued its course away from the Japanese, it came upon the charging screening force, led by the damaged Hoel. Evans then had Johnston rejoin the attack to provide gun support to Commander Thomas' small squadron on their torpedo run. Attacking Tone, the leading heavy cruiser to the east of the formation, Johnston closed to 6,000 yards (5,500 m), now firing with reduced efficiency due to her lost SC radar, yet still registering many hits.

During the battle, Evans engaged in several duels with much larger Japanese opponents. At 0820, emerging through smoke and rain squalls, Johnston was confronted by Kongō, a 36,600-ton battleship. Johnston fired at least 40 rounds, and more than 15 hits on the battleship's superstructure were observed. Johnston reversed course and disappeared in the smoke, avoiding Kongō's 14-inch return fire. Responding at 0830, Johnston bore down on a huge cruiser firing at the helpless Gambier Bay, then closed to 6,000 yards (5,500 m) and fired for ten minutes at a heavier and better-armed opponent, possibly Haguro, scoring numerous hits.

At 0840, a much more pressing target appeared astern. A formation of seven Japanese destroyers in two columns was closing in to attack the carriers. Reversing course to intercept, Evans attempted to pass in front of the formation, crossing the "T", a classical naval maneuver which would have put the force being "crossed" at a great disadvantage. Evans ordered Johnston's guns to fire on this new threat. The Japanese destroyers returned fire, striking Johnston several times. Perhaps seeing his disadvantage, the commander of the lead destroyer turned away to the west. From as close as 7,000 yards (6,400 m), Hagen fired and scored a dozen hits on the destroyer leader before it veered off. He shifted fire to the next destroyer in line, scoring five hits before it too turned away. Amazingly, the entire squadron turned west to avoid Johnston's fire. At 0920, these destroyers finally managed to fire their torpedoes from extreme range, 10,500 yd (9,600 m). Several torpedoes were detonated by strafing aircraft or defensive fire from the carriers, and the rest failed to strike a target.

Now the Japanese and American ships were intertwined in a confused jumble. Gambier Bay and Hoel were sinking. Finding targets was not difficult. After 0900, with Hoel and Samuel B. Roberts out of the fight, the crippled Johnston was an easy target. Fighting with all she had, she exchanged fire with four cruisers and numerous destroyers.

Johnston continued to take hits from the Japanese, which knocked out the number one gun mount, killing many men. By 0920, forced from the bridge by exploding ammunition, Evans was commanding the ship from the stern by shouting orders down to men manually operating the rudder. Shell fire knocked out the remaining engine, leaving Johnston dead in the water at 0940. As her attackers gathered around the vulnerable ship, they concentrated fire on her rather than the fleeing carriers. Johnston was hit so many times that one survivor recalled "they couldn't patch holes fast enough to keep her afloat."

At 0945, Evans finally gave the order to abandon ship. Johnston sank 25 minutes later with 186 of her crew. Evans abandoned ship with his crew, but was never seen again. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. However, it was the Japanese themselves who first recognized Johnston's incredible actions that day: As a Japanese destroyer cruised slowly by, Robert Billie and several other crewmen watched as her captain saluted the sinking Johnston.
--
Roger

Very good read. I am a WWII buff and as we all know the movies only concentrate on the ships like the Yorktown and Lexington. This read was very educational for me. Thanks for the post.
 
The Japanese scored a tactical victory at Coral Sea, in that they lost fewer ships. However, it was a strategic victory for the U.S., because the Japanese had to literally reverse course for troop carrying ships to the Solomon Islands and New Guinea areas; it changed their strategic aims in that area, and enabled the U.S. to invade the Solomon Islands at Guadalcanal in August.

U.S.S. Yorktown was severely damaged, but ship repair crews at Pearl Harbor turned her around in time for her service at Midway.

Admiral Chester Nimitz had been charged by President Roosevelt to "get out to Pearl Harbor, and not come home until we've won".

Guadalcanal was an iffy campaign for months, owed in no small part to miscues by Admiral Robert Ghormley, and his support of the Marines, and the Navy's underestimation of the Japanese Navy's surface fleet.
 
Although I'll freely admit I forgot the day (I have a hard time remembering my own birthday, February 31st, I think), I remember reading about the battle several times. Good post!
 
A crucial battle and the end of the dreadnaught era and the many who labored to save the Yorktown for the Battle of Midway really made a difference. God bless all those who gave all.
 
A question on my test for E8 was "What was the first naval battle where [neither] sides ships saw each other?"
Being a history buff I know it was the battle of Midway.
[...]
I do not doubt you got the correct answer on your test in 1972, the Battle of the Coral Sea. Midway is better known in this country but it was not the first.

Early in 1942 our goal was keeping Australia available to amass troops and equipment on for the eventual push north. The following fight over Guadalcanal was to prevent the Japanese bombing the Liberty Ships and transports headed to Australia. They would not have had enough fuel to sail from the USA to Australia if they had to stay out of range of bombers flying off Guadalcanal and we had no allies in Central or South America that would allow use of their ports.

While in the USA the Battle of the Coral Sea is mostly only remembered by WWII buffs it is a national holiday in Australia. They appreciate those troop transports being turned around.
 
Back
Top