What is your take on George Armstrong Custer?

Again,

Reading the court of inquiry is suspect because the Army had issues to hide, an embarrasing loss to a supposedly "weaker" and "lesser" ally.

But, it would be a necessary read for anyone interested in the battle. I have not read it but will some day.

In combat, in modern times as at Bighorn/Greasy Grass a particpant's "eyewitness" view is always suspect as well. Just the challenges I have read of knowing much of anything outside of the respondents immediate view, the "fog" of war, the fears, the mind-racing at fever pitch, etc. First hand reports should not be ignored but should always be studied with an eye for lack of detail to the passions involved in being in combat. Reno was definitely rendered ineffective by his apparent mental breakdown. His reports of the number of Indians is always suspect.

By the time of the first ford attempt and for sure by the second the units under Custer's command were already being overwhelmed. His splitting of his comand initially [Reno and Benteen] WAS the accepted military strategy of the time by almost all Army commanders when attacking a village. His splitting of his later command [if he did so] was a mistake but then again he probably was not aware of what was about to happen in the next few minutes.

And I do not think he was "standing around and waiting on Benteen" he was moving and looking for advantageous ground and hoping Benteen would arrive. No matter the time that Benteen COULD have arrived, his only accomplishment would have been to add to the casualty figures of the Army. However his orders were to proceed to Custer, and not stop at Reno. Several of his officers vehemently reminded him of that order. Weir was one of them and when Benteen finally allowed him to proceed he only got to Wier Point where he was assaulted and had to retreat back to Reno.

I have read Lakota Noon and this is the book whereby the Indian particpants themselves report the damage was mostly done with arrows and not rifles, repeating or otherwise. Also, many Indians would not give interviews for fear of reprisals. Hence the book is a compilation of only a few and those are repetitive throughout the book. And again, Indian or White Man, it does not matter, in the fog of war the "eyewitness" reports will vary widely. Any police officer today in interviewing five witnesses to a simple traffic accident will quite often get five different views.

Again, until Bighorn/Greasy Grass, very few White military officers had much reverence for Indian warfare as fought by the Indians. Before and after the Fetterman Massacre it was common to send out small detachments of troops, even infantry alone, to guard wood details and the such when it was fully known that there existed many and or large numbers of Indians in the vicinity.

Study the Battle of Beecher's Island. Why would any sane officer lead 50 men into the heart of Cheyenne territory knowing that they could easily field 500 or more [estimated 700 by the whites] warriors? It was because the prevailing opinion, even after Fetterman, was that given the firepower of Army troops and the plan to attack or defend on open ground, from cover, with clear fields of fire was to mean a victory for the Army. The mountain men and trappers knew this. Anybody who traveled into hostile territory knew it. Nelson Story from Texas, took a herd of cattle into Montana via the Bozeman Trail through the same territory that Fetterman was later massacred on. His men were all armed with two revolvers and a single-shot Remington Rolling Block, purchased by him. His attempting this, knowing the Sioux were hostile, begs the question why? It was because he gambled on known knowledge that if he could have open country and good fields of fire, even though his men were spread out with the cattle herd, he might could make it. He did and lucky for him he had no troubles with the same Sioux who later killed Fetterman.

When Colonel MacKenzie led his men single file down a narrow trail into Palo Duro Canyon he was facing an equal or larger number of Comanche. As his first troops hit the bottom they were assaulted. They held until the rest of the command came down and then they charged the village. The Comanche fought the standard retreating skirmish. Had they fought an assault they would had probably done in MacKenizie wholly or done great damage. This was in 1874.

Crook was attempting to assault the Indian villages on the Rosebud, in the same manner as was Custer, but in different terrain. Before he could truly get set up he was assaulted by the Indians who were "supposed" to be fighting a retreating skirmish. Crook was defeated two weeks before Custer and Custer had no reports of Crook's defeat because Crook had to retreat back to his start point incommunicado with the rest of the Army operation up on the Yellowstone where Custer started from.

I came to my conclusions well before I finally read a book that confirmed them. "Cavalier in Buckskin" by Robert M. Utley was that book. His final chapter, "Judgements", pretty well confirms my suspicions. Mr. Utley is considered one of the foremost Western Americana historians and a many times printed historian of several authoritative books on the Western U. S. Army.

My suspicions came by accident. His by written, historical experience. His book supports my theories. You may want to read it.
 
There were no Indian villiages at the Rosebud..they had all come from LBH. The Indians went out and attacked.

It is true each of the officers testimony does offer a differnt perspective from the vantage point of where they stood. But the similarities in each of the stories is the paramount thing.
 
tabs,

Crook fought the same Sioux on the Rosebud that Custer fought on the Bighorn.

The "reports" by the surviving officers are only a very small part of a larger history involving the campaign and its aftermath.

Since after Curly's departure there were no witnesses other than the Sioux, Cheyene, and Arapahoe who were victorious, and since most of them did not and would not talk...no one knows much other than the few archealogical facts and supposition in the form of historians either searching for the truth or just repeating worn out suppositions of others without further investigation...or reading, or knowledge.

The only other way to attempt to understand Custer's motivations is to read a larger history of the entire U. S. Army's operations in the West. And to read the larger history of any and all fights between Red and White.

I suggest you educate yourself further, and in greater detail, and then come back next year.

A good start is the book I mentioned.

Regards.
 
The Real Reason For Failure

There was a reason G.A. Custer was last in his class at West Point. And I think that completely explains his abject failure at the Little Bighorn!
 
A prairie fire a few years ago exposed the battle field and cartridge cases indicated that the Indians with Henry rifles fired 13 cartridges to each one fired by the troopers. The Indians also used fire and maneuver tactics against troopers exposed on the ridges.
One of the first things they did was stampede the cavalry mounts and spare ammunition.
They decimated the skirmish line on Cahoun Hill, rolled up Keogh's skirmish line and forced the survivors to join Custer's troopers on last stand hill.

The 7th was simply overwhelmed by firepower of repeating rifles obtained on the reservations and arching/falling arrows fired from the protection of gullies and depressions around last stand hill.
The troopers had few good targets to shoot at and the Indians could flock shoot the troops gathered in a tangle at the top of the hill.
 
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Well, took Me an hour to read all 150 posts ! I always thought I was fairly knowledgeable about this subject, I haven't even scratched the surface.

One thing I would like to add ; a member mentioned Custer intended to attack the village " full of the elderly, women and kids " . I believe He meant to capture the village and it's occupants and use them as a bargaining tool to force the roving bands back to the reservation.
 
bobsdad said:
According to Stephen Ambrose'1975 book "Crazy Horse and Custer", Custer made four critical mistakes: (paraphrasing a bit):
1. He refused to accept Terry's offer of four troops of the 2nd Cav. If Reno had had two more troops with him, he might have had sufficient momentum to make a successful chafrge when he first came upon the Sioux camp. Had Custer had two more troops with him, he might have made it up the hill.
2. Custer badly underestimated his enemy, not so much in terms of numbers as in terms of fighting capability, where he was disastrously wrong.
3. He assumed that his men could do what he could do; to put it another way, he attacked too soon. He should have spent June 25 resting, then attacked the next day, when Gibbon could have, on urgent request, reinforced him. All Indian accounts agree that Custer's men and horses, like Reno's, were so exhausted that their legs trembled. It was a hot day, which further cut the trooper's efficiency. He committed his command when he did not know his enemie's position, strength, or location. He also lost the element of surprise. His enemies knew more about his force than he knew about them.
4. When he lost the initiative, he failed to gain the high ground and dig in, although here one should perhaps blame Custer less and praise Crazy Horse more.

I've read a lot about Custer and the Little Big Horn and have been there. It is difficult, and maybe impossible, to make a sound judgment of Custer in this day and age. We are making judgements in our context, and not in the context of the world he lived in at the time. From documented testimony of the time, there is no dispute that he was a brave man. But several of his subordinates truly did not like him and thought he kept a favored clique. It was also pretty clear that he would abandon his men if need be to win a battle and gain added fame. But if you read about any of the other military leaders of the later 18th century, many (not all) demonstrated the same mixture of faults, skill, and good traits.
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MISTAKE #5-- he left his Gatlin gun home :(
 
The words of Brad Pitt's character Rory Devaney to Treat William's character Billy Burke in the movie The Devil's Own come to mine.

"You're a stupid man."

A unprepared and overconfident man is a stupid man, period.
 
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cmort666 said:
I see him so frequently on the various History and Discovery Channels that I had no idea that he'd died. Too bad. I'll miss him almost as much as Ian Hogg.
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Same here.Back when the history channel was a great channel--I saw both of them appear on numerous shows they aired. I didnt know either had passed away.
 
Oh and,thanks for the revival of this topic.Ive learned more in this topic than the books ive read. I would like to see CMORT and the big Ape--get together and write a book on this battle.

As far as any opinions on Custer I may have, im not qualified to have one as its probably nowhere near accurate to the real Custer. He may have been brash or whatever? but like mentioned be a few--nobody cant say he wasnt brave.
 
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