AR-15 ban approved by SCOTUS

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Maybe a more accurate phrasing that the Supreme Court declined to hear the Maryland AR-15 ban case.

The case had been brought up in 15 consecutive conferences where the justices discuss which cases to take. This meant a significant interest in the Maryland case and the split in Appeals Courts along similar fact patterns.

Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch wanted to hear the case. Kavanaugh sounded interested. The rest of the Justices were not.

Maybe unfortunately, the case wasn’t approved for consideration by four justices… Or maybe the support wasn’t there for a slam dunk decision. Keeping powder dry for a clearer case might work out better.

Supreme Court declines to hear gun-control challenges

After considering them at 15 consecutive conferences, the Supreme Court on Monday declined to take up two challenges to gun-control laws in Maryland and Rhode Island. In each case, three justices indicated […]
www.scotusblog.com www.scotusblog.com
 
decuerno said:
It’s difficult to argue “states rights”…then claim that states don’t have the authority to make local choices.
Click to expand...

You mean like voter ID, or immigration nullification...like that?

All three (AR15 included) involve US Constitution, and in the case of Maryland an Enumerated Right.

I mean you can't have a Poll Tax or a Voter Test (although that's a good idea imo) can you?
 
AlHunt said:
Clarence Thomas is laying low and waiting for a different case.
Click to expand...
He did the opposite; he went further than these other three justices did.

Justice Clarence Thomas dissented from the denial of review. Because AR-15s are “arms,” he reasoned, the Maryland law can only be upheld if the state can show that its ban is consistent with the country’s historical tradition of gun regulation.
AR-15s do not, Thomas stressed, “fall within the historic exception for dangerous and unusual weapons” because AR-15s are not “unusual” but in fact the most popular civilian rifle in the United States. Thomas “would not wait,” he wrote, “to decide whether the government can ban” it – particularly when, he said, “lower courts in the jurisdictions that ban AR-15s appear bent on distorting this Court’s Second Amendment precedents.”
 
If you thought at the time that Roberts couldn't get worse, he has clearly told you to "hold my martini and watch this" ever since. The only reason I can think of for all of this is that Roberts' is cringingly terrified of criticism coming from the mainstream media and the threat of being disinvited from the Washington DC cocktails-and-canapes party circuit he enjoys so much.

And then there's Coney Barrett... a "moderate" that is essentially a "moderate" Sandra Day O'Connor on steroids. If anybody has an explanation for her as allegedly being a textualist, originalist, Constitutionalist after watching her opinions and votes over the last few years that says anything other than Barrett thinking that if she styles herself after Roberts career on SCOTUS she has a very good chance of being the very first female Chief Justice, I'd like to hear it.

There is nothing remotely close to Constitutional, originalist, textualist, etc in so many of these decisions that Roberts and/or Barrett provide the deciding votes to side with the three openly pro-Democrat agenda justices on the court. And Kavanaugh for his part strikes me as loathe to provide any vote that might upset the status quo, unless he sees no way avoiding doing so - including hoping to kick the can down the road as he apparently wanted to do here.

The Roberts SCOTUS both before and after Barrett and Kavanaugh were added is a reminder of why the Democrat agenda is primarily installed and advanced at the court level - not at the ballot box and elections. A reminder of the Warren court for those of us old enough to remember.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Jäger1 said:
He did the opposite; he went further than these other three justices did.

Justice Clarence Thomas dissented from the denial of review. Because AR-15s are “arms,” he reasoned, the Maryland law can only be upheld if the state can show that its ban is consistent with the country’s historical tradition of gun regulation.
AR-15s do not, Thomas stressed, “fall within the historic exception for dangerous and unusual weapons” because AR-15s are not “unusual” but in fact the most popular civilian rifle in the United States. Thomas “would not wait,” he wrote, “to decide whether the government can ban” it – particularly when, he said, “lower courts in the jurisdictions that ban AR-15s appear bent on distorting this Court’s Second Amendment precedents.”
Click to expand...
I had not seen that he wrote a dissent. If he did, then there seem to have been 4 justices wanting to grant review. I wonder why it was denied...
 
AlHunt said:
I had not seen that he wrote a dissent.
Click to expand...
You wrote that he was silent - what I posted was a summary of what he wrote in his dissent of the court's denial of review.

In fact, there were THREE dissents written in response to the majority decision to deny review. Thomas's dissent was the longest and most detailed - it's eight pages long and there for you to read. You're better off reading it in the far better format provided by SCOTUS in publishing the decision than from how I can copy and past (with poor formatting) Thomas's dissent here.


Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
THOMAS , J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DAVID SNOPE, ET AL . v. ANTHONY G. BROWN, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
MARYLAND, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–203. Decided June 2, 2025

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting from the denial of certiorari.

The State of Maryland prohibits ownership of AR–15s,
the most popular civilian rifle in America. Md. Crim. Law
Code Ann. §4–303(a)(2) (2025). This petition presents the
question whether this ban is consistent with the Second
Amendment. The Fourth Circuit held that it is, reasoning
that AR–15s are not “arms” protected by the Second
Amendment. Bianchi v. Brown, 111 F. 4th 438, 448 (2024)
(en banc). I would grant certiorari to review this surprising
conclusion.
I
The Second Amendment guarantees “the right of the peo-
ple to keep and bear Arms.” When raising a Second Amend-
ment challenge, an individual has the initial burden of
showing that “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers
[his] conduct.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v.
Bruen, 597 U. S. 1, 17 (2022). Once a challenger makes that
showing, “the Constitution presumptively protects [his]
conduct,” and the burden shifts to the government to
“demonstrate that [its] regulation is consistent with this
Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Ibid. If
the government fails to make that showing, the restriction
must be deemed unconstitutional. Ibid.
It is difficult to see how Maryland’s categorical prohibi-
tion on AR–15s passes muster under this framework. To

2 SNOPE v. BROWN
THOMAS , J., dissenting
start, AR–15s are clearly “Arms” under the Second Amend-
ment’s plain text. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U. S. 570 (2008), we held that the term “Arms” in this con-
text covers all “ ‘[w]eapons of offence, or armour of defence.’ ”
Id., at 581; see also ibid. (explaining that “Arms” include
“ ‘any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into
his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another’ ”).
Thus, “the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that
were not in existence at the time of the founding.” Id., at
582; accord, United States v. Rahimi, 602 U. S. 680, 691
(2024); Bruen, 597 U. S., at 28; Caetano v. Massachusetts,
577 U. S. 411 (2016) (per curiam). AR–15s fall squarely
within this category.
Because AR–15s are “Arms,” the burden shifts to Mary-
land to show that banning AR–15s is “consistent with this
Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen,
597 U. S., at 17. But, I am not aware of any “historical reg-
ulation” that could serve as “a proper analogue” to Mary-
land’s ban. Id., at 28–29.
Maryland invokes the “historical tradition of prohibiting
the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’ ” Heller,
554 U. S., at 627 (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England 148–149 (1769)); see Brief in Opposi-
tion 22–23. Under this tradition, however, “[a] weapon may
not be banned unless it is both dangerous and unusual.”
Caetano, 577 U. S., at 417 (ALITO , J., concurring in judg-
ment). “[W]eapons ‘in common use’ today for self-defense”
and other lawful purposes remain fully protected. Bruen,
597 U. S., at 32 (quoting Heller, 554 U. S., at 627). And,
AR–15s appear to fit neatly within that category of pro-
tected arms. Tens of millions of Americans own AR–15s,
and the “overwhelming majority” of them “do so for lawful
purposes, including self-defense and target shooting.”
Friedman v. Highland Park, 577 U. S. 1039, 1042 (2015)
(THOMAS, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of

3Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
THOMAS , J., dissenting
certiorari); accord, ante, at 1–2 (KAVANAUGH, J., statement
respecting denial of certiorari); Harrel v. Raoul, 603 U. S.
___, ___ (2024) (THOMAS, J., statement respecting denial of
certiorari) (slip op., at 2). “[A] prohibition of an entire class
of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American soci-
ety for th[ese] lawful purpose” falls outside the govern-
ment’s power. Heller, 554 U. S., at 628.
II
Despite the foregoing, the Fourth Circuit upheld Mary-
land’s ban on the ground that AR–15s are not “ ‘constitu-
tionally protected arms’ ” under the plain text of the Second
Amendment. 111 F. 4th, at 448. The court acknowledged
that, “[a]t first blush, it may appear that [AR–15s] fit com-
fortably within the term ‘arms.’ ” Id., at 447. But, the court
insisted, more is required. Because the Second Amendment
“must be interpreted against its historical and legal back-
drop,” the Fourth Circuit held that the challengers also had
to show that “the right to possess” AR–15s falls within “the
historical scope of the right to keep and bear arms.” Id., at
448. The challengers could not make this showing, in the
court’s view, because the Second Amendment does not pro-
tect the right to own “ ‘dangerous and unusual weapons,’ ”
including AR–15s. Id., at 450, 454–459.
This reasoning is dubious at least twice over. The Fourth
Circuit placed too high a burden on the challengers to show
that the Second Amendment presumptively protected their
conduct. And, its determination that AR–15s are danger-
ous and unusual does not withstand scrutiny.
3Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
THOMAS , J., dissenting
certiorari); accord, ante, at 1–2 (KAVANAUGH, J., statement
respecting denial of certiorari); Harrel v. Raoul, 603 U. S.
___, ___ (2024) (THOMAS, J., statement respecting denial of
certiorari) (slip op., at 2). “[A] prohibition of an entire class
of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American soci-
ety for th[ese] lawful purpose” falls outside the govern-
ment’s power. Heller, 554 U. S., at 628.
II
Despite the foregoing, the Fourth Circuit upheld Mary-
land’s ban on the ground that AR–15s are not “ ‘constitu-
tionally protected arms’ ” under the plain text of the Second
Amendment. 111 F. 4th, at 448. The court acknowledged
that, “[a]t first blush, it may appear that [AR–15s] fit com-
fortably within the term ‘arms.’ ” Id., at 447. But, the court
insisted, more is required. Because the Second Amendment
“must be interpreted against its historical and legal back-
drop,” the Fourth Circuit held that the challengers also had
to show that “the right to possess” AR–15s falls within “the
historical scope of the right to keep and bear arms.” Id., at
448. The challengers could not make this showing, in the
court’s view, because the Second Amendment does not pro-
tect the right to own “ ‘dangerous and unusual weapons,’ ”
including AR–15s. Id., at 450, 454–459.
This reasoning is dubious at least twice over. The Fourth
Circuit placed too high a burden on the challengers to show
that the Second Amendment presumptively protected their
conduct. And, its determination that AR–15s are danger-
ous and unusual does not withstand scrutiny.
A
The Fourth Circuit erred by requiring the challengers to
prove that the Second Amendment protects their right to
own AR–15s—or, in the terms of our Second Amendment
jurisprudence, that their conduct falls outside the historical
exceptions to the right to keep and bear arms. A challenger


4 SNOPE v. BROWN
THOMAS , J., dissenting
need only show that “the plain text” of the Second Amend-
ment covers his conduct. Bruen, 597 U. S., at 32. This bur-
den is met if the law at issue “regulates” Americans’ “arms-
bearing conduct.” Rahimi, 602 U. S., at 691. Once the chal-
lenger makes this initial showing, it is the government’s
burden to show that a historic limit on the right to bear
arms nevertheless justifies its regulation. The Fourth Cir-
cuit placed the burden of producing historical evidence on
the wrong party.
Our precedents make plain the Fourth Circuit’s error. In
Bruen, we had “little difficulty” determining that “the plain
text of the Second Amendment” encompasses “carrying
handguns publicly for self-defense.” 597 U. S., at 32. We
considered the historical limits on the right to bear arms
only to determine whether the State had met its burden of
proving that its regulation was historically justified. See
id., at 34–70. Likewise, in Rahimi, the Court found it self-
evident that a law prohibiting individuals subject to domes-
tic-violence restraining orders from possessing firearms
“regulates arms-bearing conduct.” 602 U. S., at 691, 693.
The Court again considered historical limits only after
shifting the burden of proof to the Government. See id., at
693–702.
The Fourth Circuit based its contrary approach on an
analogy to the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment,
but that analogy only underscores its error. The court rea-
soned that historical evidence is necessary to prevent an
overbroad understanding of the Second Amendment, just as
the Free Speech Clause excludes historically unprotected
categories of speech such as “libel, incitement, true threats,
fighting words, or falsely shouting fire in a crowded thea-
ter.” 111 F. 4th, at 447. As we explained in Bruen, how-
ever, “ ‘the Government bears the burden of proving the con-
stitutionality’ ” of speech restrictions. 597 U. S., at 24
(emphasis added). “[T]hat burden includes showing
whether the expressive conduct falls outside of the category


5Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
THOMAS , J., dissenting
of protected speech” by “point[ing] to historical evidence
about the reach of the First Amendment’s protections.” Id.,
at 24–25 (emphasis deleted). Treating the Second Amend-
ment “like . . . other constitutional provisions,” 111 F. 4th,
at 448, we have similarly placed the burden on the govern-
ment to show that a regulation of arms-bearing conduct
falls outside the Second Amendment’s protection.
Under the plain text of the Second Amendment, the chal-
lengers’ only burden is to show that AR–15s are bearable
“Arms”—i.e., “ ‘[w]eapons of offence.’ ” Heller, 554 U. S., at
581. By any measure, they are.
B
The Fourth Circuit separately erred in determining that
AR–15s fall within the historic exception for dangerous and
unusual weapons. “A weapon may not be banned” under
this principle “unless it is both dangerous and unusual.”
Caetano, 577 U. S., at 417 (opinion of ALITO , J.). Weapons
“ ‘in common use’ today for self-defense” are fully protected.
Bruen, 597 U. S., at 32 (quoting Heller, 554 U. S., at 627).
The Fourth Circuit nevertheless eschewed any inquiry into
the commonality of AR–15s and the purposes for which they
are used, which it dismissed as an “ill-conceived popularity
test.” 111 F. 4th, at 460. Instead, the court performed its
own independent investigation of AR–15s’ “utility for self-
defense,” examining their “military origin,” “firepower,”
and “muzzle velocity,” among other features. Id., at 454–
459.
Our Constitution allows the American people—not the
government—to decide which weapons are useful for self-
defense. “A constitutional guarantee subject to future
judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional
guarantee at all.” Heller, 554 U. S., at 634. In line with
that principle, and with the tradition of prohibiting only
dangerous and unusual weapons, we have never relied on
our own assessment of how useful an arm is for self-defense


6 SNOPE v. BROWN
T HOMAS , J., dissenting
before deeming it protected. In Heller, we found handguns
protected because that “class of ‘arms’ . . . is overwhelm-
ingly chosen by American society for th[e] lawful purpose”
of “self-defense.” Id., at 628. In Caetano, we recognized
that stun guns were protected arms solely because they
were not “ ‘unusual,’ ” without addressing the state court’s
holding that stun guns were “ ‘dangerous per se at common
law.’ ” 577 U. S., at 412; accord, id., at 417 (opinion of
ALITO , J.); Bruen, 597 U. S., at 28. And, in Bruen, we again
found “handguns” protected solely because they are “ ‘in
common use’ today for self-defense,” without inquiring
whether they are in fact useful for that purpose. Id., at 32.
In response, the Fourth Circuit’s “[m]ost importan[t]” ob-
jection to a “common use inquiry” was that it would “lea[d]
to absurd consequences,” such as a constitutional right to
own a “bazooka,” “ricin pellet-firing umbrella gun,” or even
a “W54 nuclear warhead” if such weapons become suffi-
ciently “popular.” 111 F. 4th, at 460 (internal quotation
marks omitted). This reasoning illustrates why the scope
of the right to bear arms cannot turn on judicial speculation
about the American people’s self-defense needs. Even if
some nuclear warheads are small enough for an individual
to carry, no reasonable person would think to use one to de-
fend himself. Still less could nuclear warheads ever become
a common means of self-defense. To fend off the fantastical
threat of Americans lobbing nuclear warheads at one an-
other, the Fourth Circuit has allowed the very real threat
of the government depriving Americans of the rifle that
they most favor for protecting themselves and their fami-
lies. Looking to the standards set “by American society” ra-
ther than our judicial colleagues, Heller, 554 U. S., at 628,
I cannot see how AR–15s fall outside the Second Amend-
ment’s protection.*
——————
* The Fourth Circuit also purported to hold in the alternative that, as-
suming that AR–15s are protected arms, banning them is consistent with


7Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
THOMAS , J., dissenting
III
I would not wait to decide whether the government can
ban the most popular rifle in America. That question is of
critical importance to tens of millions of law-abiding AR–15
owners throughout the country. We have avoided deciding
it for a full decade. See Harrel, 603 U. S. ___; Friedman,
577 U. S. 1039. And, further percolation is of little value
when lower courts in the jurisdictions that ban AR–15s ap-
pear bent on distorting this Court’s Second Amendment
precedents. See Harrel, 603 U. S., at ___ (opinion of
THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 2) (discussing the Seventh Circuit’s
parallel conclusion that AR–15s do “not even fall within the
scope of the Arms referred to by the Second Amendment”).
I doubt we would sit idly by if lower courts were to so sub-
vert our precedents involving any other constitutional
right. Until we are vigilant in enforcing it, the right to bear
arms will remain “a second-class right.” McDonald v. Chi-
cago, 561 U. S. 742, 780 (2010) (plurality opinion).
The constitutional status of AR–15s is all the more ur-
gent after this Court’s decision in Bondi v. VanDerStok, 604
U. S. ___ (2025). Recently amended regulations of the Bu-
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
provide that a “firearm” under the Gun Control Act includes
——————
a national tradition of responding to the “threats posed by excessively
harmful arms with responsive and proportional legislation.” 111 F. 4th,
at 464. This holding, however, is not genuinely independent of its mis-
guided common-use analysis. To support the existence of this tradition,
the Fourth Circuit identified several 19th-century laws prohibiting cer-
tain easily concealable weapons like pistols, dirks, sword canes, and
Bowie knives. See id., at 466–467. But, the court nowhere attempted to
explain why these laws were not simply instances of States prohibiting
dangerous and unusual weapons not in common use for self-defense. As
the dissent noted, when these laws were challenged, 19th-century courts
evaluated them based on “whether the regulated weapon was in common
use for lawful purposes.” See id., at 510–513, 533–534 (opinion of Rich-
ardson, J.).


8 SNOPE v. BROWN
THOMAS , J., dissenting
objects that “may readily be completed, assembled, re-
stored, or otherwise converted to” a working firearm. 27
CFR §478.11 (2023). In VanDerStok, this Court refused to
hold that definition unlawful, reasoning that an “artifact
noun”—that is, a “word for a thing created by humans”—
may “refer to unfinished objects,” and thus that weapon-
parts kits are as regulable as the firearms they might even-
tually become. 604 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10). But,
“ ‘every single AR–15 can be converted to a machinegun us-
ing cheap, flimsy pieces of metal—including coat hangers.’ ”
Id., at ___ (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 13) (quoting
VanDerStok v. Garland, 86 F. 4th 179, 208 (CA5 2023)
(Oldham, J., concurring)). Thus, on the Court’s logic, it
seems that ATF could at any time declare AR–15s to be ma-
chineguns prohibited by federal law. 604 U. S., at ___
(opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 13) (citing 26 U. S. C.
§§5861, 5871). Until we resolve whether the Second
Amendment forecloses that possibility, law-abiding AR–15
owners must rely on the goodwill of a federal agency to re-
tain their means of self-defense. That is “no constitutional
guarantee at all.” Heller, 554 U. S., at 634. I respectfully
dissent.
 
Thomas did not write that. HIs office (legal staff) did. Thomas only signed it.
 
decuerno said:
Thomas did not write that. HIs office (legal staff) did. Thomas only signed it.
Click to expand...
Okay then.... list the names of the members of SCOTUS who you know write their own opinions unlike Thomas!

How about a list of the Circuit Court judges that write their own opinions?
 
dben002 said:
In Maryland....

The Supreme Court on Monday turned away an appeal by a group of gun-rights advocates seeking to overturn Maryland's ban on assault-style rifles and high-capacity magazines under the Second Amendment.
Click to expand...
Being in Maryland I'd rather see the 10 round magazine max overturned than the AR-15 one.
 
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