Battle of Savo Island and the Kirishima

[Mike7.62]

To veer away from the naval topic, other than in numbers, the Stuarts weren't underdogs in the Philippines in '42. My last day on active duty in '84, I met a guy who'd been a National Guard tanker there. He said that until they ran out of main gun ammunition, they went through the Japanese tankers like Schumer through a goose. He also said that he'd wished that they'd had AP-HE instead of AP.

I don't think the Japanese Type 97 Chi-Ha was anything like a PzKw Mk IIIb or IV, much less a Tiger, especially when the thickest armor was 26mm on the sides of the turret, so it's no surprise that the Stuart was effective in the Pacific.

The later versions of the Type 97 had a 46mm main gun which was of higher velocity than the 57mm, and made it more of a match for the M3, as it could hit at a longer distance and penetrate thicker armor.

The 37mm gun on the M3 had a MV of 2900 f/s and was effective at 1000 yards on 25mm armor, which was the thickest that the Japanese Type 97 had, so it had good performance against Japanese armor. It's performance against German armor was somewhat different, as evidenced at Kasserine Pass and Sicily. The Stuart continued good service in the Pacific, but was rather ineffective in the ETO, though it continued to be used there until the end of the war.

I would agree that the M3 going up against virtually any armor the Germans had was an underdog in a serious way, but they were on a much more even footing against the Japanese.

 

[rwsmith]

Holy Quacamole

Look at the drawing with the hits! Thanks, I'm always interested in a good history lesson.

 

[cmort666]

In the confusion of this action the Japanese Admiral Abe did not realise that his forces had won and ordered a withdrawal.

That wouldn't be the last time that happened.

The largest battleship in the world and her escorts would later flee from seemingly doomed collection of destroyers, destroyer escorts and escort carriers, whom the Japanese had already shredded.

Just one of many examples of the benefit of extreme aggression in the face of seemingly insurmountable odds.

 

[cmort666]

I would agree that the M3 going up against virtually any armor the Germans had was an underdog in a serious way, but they were on a much more even footing against the Japanese.

An even greater handicap for the Japanese was their mind bogglingly wrong headed armored doctrine.

Unlike virtually EVERY army in the world at the time, Japanese doctrine was that the crew of a disabled tank fought to the death ON that disabled tank. Everybody ELSE bailed out, and either got on another tank or fled on foot, disabling essential systems if necessary and possible. Tank recovery units then recovered and repaired the vehicle if possible after the battle.

Even at Japanese levels of industrial productions, it took at most a few days to build a tank. No matter who you are, it takes a bare minimum of MONTHS to build an effective tank crew. Japanese doctrine ensured that when they lost a tank, they also lost a trained crew, and maybe a trained unit leader.

A lot of other Japanese doctrine was astonishingly bad as well, but didn't stand out when fighting Chinese with Hanyang rifles and broadswords, and untrained, badly equipped, poorly led Western troops.

All of this was exposed during the Battle of Nomonhan in 1939, but was largely missed in the greater issue of the start of WWII.

 

[cmort666]

I don't think the Japanese Type 97 Chi-Ha was anything like a PzKw Mk IIIb or IV, much less a Tiger, especially when the thickest armor was 26mm on the sides of the turret, so it's no surprise that the Stuart was effective in the Pacific.

They were more on a par with the Vickers Medium or lighter '30s British tanks.

The BTs at Nomonhan shredded them, even in the hands of the haunted post-purges Red Army. I don't recall if there were any KVs there (or in service yet), but if there were, the slaughter would have been even more dire.

 

[Cyrano]

BTW, it was Adm. Lee who was OIC during the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, where radar was used to great effect and the "Kurishima" was sunk.

.

If I remember correctly what I read in Crossman (Book of the Springfield?), Lee, while a midshipman at the Naval Academy, took first place at Camp Perry one year in BOTH the rifle and pistol National Matches.

 

[k22fan]

[...] Lee, while a midshipman at the Naval Academy, took first place at Camp Perry one year in BOTH the rifle and pistol National Matches.

This is also in James Hornfischer's Neptune's Inferno: the U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal. Apparently, in addition to his keen interest in radar, a back ground in rifle marksmanship didn't hurt Admiral Lee. After all, in navy vocabulary Lee's crew were firing 16" 45 caliber rifles.

Incidentally, Hornfischer wrote that to reduce stress Admiral Nimitz's shrink recommended he occasionally take time off to pursue target shooting with his pistol, and Nimitz regularly followed that advise. Nimitz was overall naval commander for the Pacific theater.

 

[HOUSTON RICK]

World War II. Some of us have emptied libraries of WW II books and movies, had uncles and fathers in combat, know the battles, strategies, equipment and commanders on all sides and our kids say World War what?

 

[Dennis The B]

I'm reading "Neptune's Inferno..." now. I've just finished the initial night action chapters, and the book is riveting, to say the least!

One thing not mentioned yet, is the disdain that the USN command staff had for Japanese sailors and their fighting capabilities. In some other books I've read, it was widely thought that Japanese naval personnel had poor eyesight, and could not fight in night engagements. The events of 8-9 August 1942 evidently put this myth to rest.

The book also provides a great background on the commanders on the U.S. side, and the establishment of SOPAC.

I knew that Admiral King always believed he was the smartest person he ever knew, and his command selections and decisions bore out this character trait. That he and Frank Knox, managed to stay clean after Pearl Harbor and the battles off Savo Island, still befuddles me.

I quite understand that someone had to "fall on the sword" after Pearl Harbor, but Admiral Kimmel and General Short certainly weren't deserving of the treatment they received for the incompetence of the navy and army command staffs.

 

[mjr]

One thing not mentioned yet, is the disdain that the USN command staff had for Japanese sailors and their fighting capabilities. In some other books I've read, it was widely thought that Japanese naval personnel had poor eyesight, and could not fight in night engagements. The events of 8-9 August 1942 evidently put this myth to rest.

Sometimes racism's chickens come home to roost.

 

[shouldazagged]

Sometimes racism's chickens come home to roost.

Yeah, I don't recall the military belittling and underestimating the fighting capabilities of the Waffen SS or the Luftwaffe. Or even the Wehrmacht grunts.

 

[jlrhiner]

Yeah, I don't recall the military belittling and underestimating the fighting capabilities of the Waffen SS or the Luftwaffe. Or even the Wehrmacht grunts.

That's an easy one. They (Germany) didn't sneak attack us. If it hadn't been for Adolph declaring war on the U.S. a few days after Pearl, I doubt we would have declared war on Germany. Only a complete moron wants to fight a war on two fronts.

 

[shouldazagged]

That's an easy one. They (Germany) didn't sneak attack us. If it hadn't been for Adolph declaring war on the U.S. a few days after Pearl, I doubt we would have declared war on Germany. Only a complete moron wants to fight a war on two fronts.

My point, regardless of how the war started, was that we (the U.S.) didn't assume big "Aryan" Germans were inferior fighters with poor eyesight. We did think that small yellow Japanese were.

We were wrong about the Japanese, and it cost us a hell of a lot of young men before the facts became clear.

 

[wbraswell]

Both Japanese and Germans, had serious doubts about the courage and tenacity of Americans. Guess we showed them.
Of course, to be fair about it, we ALL dehumanize our enemies, and we all use propaganda.

 

[cmort666]

That's an easy one. They (Germany) didn't sneak attack us. If it hadn't been for Adolph declaring war on the U.S. a few days after Pearl, I doubt we would have declared war on Germany. Only a complete moron wants to fight a war on two fronts.

I don't know how many times I've heard "How could Hitler have won the war?" I always reply, "By not being Hitler."

 

[cmort666]

My point, regardless of how the war started, was that we (the U.S.) didn't assume big "Aryan" Germans were inferior fighters with poor eyesight. We did think that small yellow Japanese were.

We were wrong about the Japanese, and it cost us a hell of a lot of young men before the facts became clear.

I highly recommend the book, "War Without Mercy". It's about the racial and cultural aspects of the Pacific War.

The Japanese thought we wouldn't fight, and we thought that they couldn't.

We were both wrong.

 

[therevjay]

Both Japanese and Germans, had serious doubts about the courage and tenacity of Americans. Guess we showed them.
Of course, to be fair about it, we ALL dehumanize our enemies, and we all use propaganda.

Well we used to anyway. Now it seems we're afraid to hurt the enemies feelings.

 

[Mike7.62]

That's an easy one. They (Germany) didn't sneak attack us. If it hadn't been for Adolph declaring war on the U.S. a few days after Pearl, I doubt we would have declared war on Germany. Only a complete moron wants to fight a war on two fronts.

I don't know about that. There's a very good argument to be made that FDR maneuvered the Japanese into an attack through his use of embargoes on steel, oil, and other strategic commodities. Since the Japanese were part of the Axis, the likelihood of Germany coming to the aid of their ally Japan was excellent.

FDR was spoiling for a fight with Germany after 1940, and the anti war mood of the majority of the people in the US at the time precluded doing much more than "Lend Lease". Maneuvering Japan into an attack did much to solve his problem.

 

[Mike7.62]

World War II. Some of us have emptied libraries of WW II books and movies, had uncles and fathers in combat, know the battles, strategies, equipment and commanders on all sides and our kids say World War what?

Ain't that the truth. One of my (then) teenaged nephews was surprised to learn that we had ever fought the Japanese. Public indoctrination strikes again.

 

[shouldazagged]

Ain't that the truth. One of my (then) teenaged nephews was surprised to learn that we had ever fought the Japanese. Public indoctrination strikes again.

To many young people today Desert Storm is ancient history and Vietnam might has well have been in the Middle Ages. Unfortunately they seem to be receiving no serious education about our wars between Iraq/Afghanistan and the Revolutionary War. Maybe a little simplistic stuff about Lincoln.

I see it less as indoctrination than as ****-poor prioritizing.

 

[jlrhiner]

If they taught our history as it actually was, they would be hard pressed to sell the "benevolent society" to the present generations.

 

[Cyrano]

I posted this once before but will do it again.

I was at a gun show in San Antonio, reading a book behind my table, waiting for someone with lots of money to come by. A young man, with a few teen age boys in tow came along. Don't know what they were doing. He made conversation:" What's that you're reading?". I held up the book so he could read the cover: Guadalcanal.
"What's that", he asked.
"Guadalcanal" I replied.
"What Canal is that?".
"The first American land offensive in the Pacific,
WW II".
"Never heard of it".

I was flabbergasted: don't kids now know any history?

 

[Dennis The B]

I don't know about that. There's a very good argument to be made that FDR maneuvered the Japanese into an attack through his use of embargoes on steel, oil, and other strategic commodities. Since the Japanese were part of the Axis, the likelihood of Germany coming to the aid of their ally Japan was excellent.

FDR was spoiling for a fight with Germany after 1940, and the anti war mood of the majority of the people in the US at the time precluded doing much more than "Lend Lease". Maneuvering Japan into an attack did much to solve his problem.

There are a number of books which take a very hard look at FDR's behavior up to December 7, 1941. The harshest of them criticize FDR for his abject naivety in world politics, and his desire to be a major player.

The Japanese intentions were never fixed in stone. Their actions were dependent on Germany's success against the USSR. Had Hitler been successful, and taken Moscow, in late 1941, the Japanese would have expanded to the northwest, attacking Russian assets in the east, Siberia, etc. The Japanese were already in Manchuria, so it would have been relatively easy for them to strike in that direction.

However, Germany had fared badly in late 1941, not defeating the USSR. The Japanese were then forced to move south from Japan, attacking along the Malay, Singapore, Indochina area. The Philippines were a target, since America had interests in the area. Grabbing Guam, Wake, the Solomon Islands, etc., became part of Japan's overall strategy. The strike at Pearl Harbor was, in part, to prevent the Pacific Fleet from attacking south and west from Hawaii.

FDR knew the Japanese would strike eastward, but did not figure that the Hawaiian Islands would be a target. Frank Knox, Ernest King, General Marshall, and others are more complicit in the disaster than FDR.

 

[k22fan]

The notion that FDR orchestrated a whooping defeat at Pear Harbor was a very popular conspiracy theory among the "greatest generation". I've looked at public library WWII book collections off and on for 40 plus years and never seen one that didn't have a copy of At Dawn We Slept. That is the best know book advocating the FDR conspiracy.

I've never thought it worth reading. A better way to look at Pearl Harbor is that the out come was the better of two possibilities. As it happened our carriers were safely out of harms way and our old battle ships sunk in shallow water where all but one were salvaged and back in operation within a year. [within 6 months?] Considering our navies lack of readiness, faulty torpedoes, numerical inferiority in carriers, etc., if our fleet had sailed out of Pear and met the Japanese it's very likely a lot of those ships would still be a half mile under water and far more of our sailors would have been lost.

The previously posted idea that Japan might have moved into Russia rather than conquer southward over looks Japan's greatest need in 1941, oil.

 

[cmort666]

The Japanese intentions were never fixed in stone.

A CRUCIAL thing to understand is that not only weren't they fixed in stone, they were neither entirely rational nor decided upon by a unitary "leader".

Unlike Germany and the Soviet Union, Japan was not ruled by an all powerful "dictator". Remember, Tojo got FIRED.

Instead, Japan was a roiling mass of conflicting political, economic and pseudo-religious interests. I've read a VERY interesting book written in the '30s, called "Government by Assassination". It's about the political background to the Japanese swerve rightward between WWI and WWII.

Japan was literally an incomprehensible morass of obscurantist "patriotic" groups, many of them eerily prefiguring Al Qaeda. They were full of drivel about the "national polity" and threats of violence. A great deal of that violence was directed at other Japanese.

Yamamoto was in serious danger of assassination for opposing a lot of this lunacy.

In Japanese strategic "decisions" you see a great deal of ambiguity, hesitation, and the clear hallmarks of "designed by a committee". A lot of Japanese orders weren't actually orders, more like "suggestions" that things go in a general direction. This is all rooted in a culture whose polite society doesn't like interpersonal conflict. Instead decisions were made to avoid organizational strife... even if they guaranteed failure on the battlefield.

And yet there was still organizational strife arising out of a culture of military insubordination, "gekokujo". It was the fundamental basis for the invasions of Manchuria and North China. In it lay the seeds of the Battle of Nomonhan and Japan's crushing defeat at the hands of the Soviets in 1939.

The Japanese system was lunatic and evil, but unlike the Nazi and Soviet systems, it was lunacy and evil by consensus rather than "Fuehrer Befehl".

 

[Mike7.62]

The notion that FDR orchestrated a whooping defeat at Pear Harbor was a very popular conspiracy theory among the "greatest generation". I've looked at public library WWII book collections off and on for 40 plus years and never seen one that didn't have a copy of At Dawn We Slept. That is the best know book advocating the FDR conspiracy.

I've never thought it worth reading. A better way to look at Pearl Harbor is that the out come was the better of two possibilities. As it happened our carriers were safely out of harms way and our old battle ships sunk in shallow water where all but one were salvaged and back in operation within a year. [within 6 months?] Considering our navies lack of readiness, faulty torpedoes, numerical inferiority in carriers, etc., if our fleet had sailed out of Pear and met the Japanese it's very likely a lot of those ships would still be a half mile under water and far more of our sailors would have been lost.

The previously posted idea that Japan might have moved into Russia rather than conquer southward over looks Japan's greatest need in 1941, oil.

I don't believe that I said or implied that FDR "...orchestrated a whooping defeat at Pear Harbor...". I said that there was a good argument to be made that his embargo of strategic commodities was designed to force the Japanese into making war on its main enemy in the Pacific, the United States, in order to remove resistance to their planned aggression to gain access to those commodities from other sources such as Indonesia, Australia etc. The attack on Pearl was the logical outcome of those policies as that was the home of the US Pacific Fleet. The fact that the Germans declared war against us less than two days later implies some fore knowledge and thought towards that action on the part of Germany.

I agree that the attack on Pearl Harbor was, in hindsight and despite the casualties, a Godsend for the reasons that you articulate. However, the reason that the attack was a strategic failure was the fact that the Japanese missed our carriers. Had they sunk the carriers, I doubt that the two battles that were decided by them would have been the victories that they were, namely the Coral Sea and Midway. Without carriers, Australia would have been in Japanese hands, and a US victory at Midway would have been an impossibility.

I also agree that the attack towards the south and west had everything to do with oil, rubber, steel, and copper, not the lack of success by the Germans.

The Germans in late '41 were still moving offensively, and even though they had stopped outside of Moscow because they had outrun their supply lines, things were not dire. Besides, the planning for Pearl Harbor was going on long before the German attack on the Soviet Union occurred. The Japanese were testing the modifications to their aerial torpedoes to deal with the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor months before the Germans launched "Barbarossa" near the end of June. They were modeling their attack on the British attack on Taranto in 1940, which also had a shallow harbor.

 

[shouldazagged]

I think I need to find and read Government By Assassination.

Heaven knows that style of governance has figured prominently in the history of many countries.

 

[jlrhiner]

And also, during the Pearl raid, the Japanese completely ignored the fuel storage and the floating dry-docks. Had those dry docks been damaged, everything would have had to go to the west coast for repair.

I don't think they were even on the original attack plans as targets.

 

[Dennis The B]

One of the better books written about WWII, its precedences, and conduct, is "Freedom Betrayed...", written by President Herbert Hoover. It was finished in 1964, shortly before his death, but not published until about two years ago.

When I first heard of the book, I thought it may be a bit of sour grapes, written by President Hoover to "get back" at FDR. However, it's one of the great books written about the period from pre-WWI, to the end of WWII.

The incompetence of FDR, his advisers, and his nearly fatal conduct of the early WWII period, is clearly shown; as well as why the British and French were incompetent for a period of forty years prior to the outbreak of WWII.

The Imperial Japanese Army and Navy were hide-bound by their Bushido code, requiring that commanding officers commit ritual suicide for so-called failures to carry out orders. Yamamoto was clearly against this policy, since a loss in battle always provides valuable lessons for the survivors.

During the fight for Guadalcanal, the IJA erred a number of times. Two of the great errors were the premature signal that Henderson Field had been captured, and using existing trails and paths to open the late-October offensive.

 

[cmort666]

I think I need to find and read Government By Assassination.

Heaven knows that style of governance has figured prominently in the history of many countries.

I believe the author's name was "Bynum".

I don't know how many decades it's been out of print. I got my copy from a used bookstore in Akron, almost twenty years ago.