Custer's "Last Stand"

In modern wars these human waves could be employed (and interestingly, also by the Zulu) because the troops attacking into the enemy's guns were ideologically, socially, or otherwise motivated to charge.
That's quite true.

In addition, the Zulus had a quite sophisticated military organization and tactical doctrine.

You could argue plausibly that the average Zulu impi was better trained, organized and led than the 7th Cavalry. Their biggest handicap was their failure to effectively employ gunpowder technology, and where possible foreign military advisors. That was a mistake that the Ethiopians wouldn't make against the Italians at Adowa.

Had the Indians fought like the Zulus there would have been more Little Big Horns.

"The Washing of the Spears" is a good book on the Zulu wars.
 
At Custer's last battle enlisted cavalry soldiers were armed with a rifle and revolver. With how much ammunition for each firearm did each soldier begin the battle?

I cant remember when and where I read it? but, I recall that it was less than 100 rounds between the two weapons.
 
From History Net:

"Not until archaeological investigations were conducted on the battlefield during the 1980s did the extent to which the Indians used gunpowder weapons come to light. Modern firearm identification analysis revealed that the Indians had spoken the truth about the variety and number of weapons they carried. The Cheyenne warrior Wooden Leg went into battle with what he called a’six-shooter’ and later captured a Springfield carbine and 40 rounds of ammunition. The Miniconjou One Bull, Sitting Bull’s nephew, owned an old muzzleloader. The Hunkpapa Iron Hawk and the Cheyenne Big Beaver had only bows and arrows. Eagle Elk, an Oglala, started the battle with a Winchester. White Cow Bull, an Oglala, also claimed to have a repeater.

There were 2,361 cartridges, cases and bullets recovered from the entire battlefield, which reportedly came from 45 different firearms types (including the Army Springfields and Colts, of course) and represented at least 371 individual guns. The evidence indicated that the Indians used Sharps, Smith & Wessons, Evans, Henrys, Winchesters, Remingtons, Ballards, Maynards, Starrs, Spencers, Enfields and Forehand & Wadworths, as well as Colts and Springfields of other calibers. There was evidence of 69 individual Army Springfields on Custer’s Field (the square-mile section where Custer’s five companies died), but there was also evidence of 62 Indian .44-caliber Henry repeaters and 27 Sharps .50-caliber weapons. In all, on Custer’s Field there was evidence of at least 134 Indian firearms versus 81 for the soldiers. It appears that the Army was outgunned as well as outnumbered.

Survivors of the remaining seven companies of the 7th Cavalry asserted that the Indians were equipped with repeating rifles and mentioned Winchesters as often as not. Major Marcus Reno claimed: ‘The Indians had Winchester rifles and the column made a large target for them and they were pumping bullets into it.’ Although some white survivors claimed to be heavily outgunned, Private Charles Windolph of Company H was probably closest to the truth when he estimated that half the warriors carried bows and arrows, one-quarter of them carried a variety of old muzzleloaders and single-shot rifles, and one-quarter carried modern repeaters"

Plus 10 on this Mein Herr.:)
 
Regarding the earlier commentary about the "broken knives" found on the battlefield, supposedly because the blades were broken from prying out stuck cartridge cases from trapdoors:

1. If so, were knife blades that weak back then?
2. It is well-known that Indians highly prized anything made of metal. So why didn't the Indians pick up all those broken knives?

I have to agree that, aside from the obvious tactical and deployment blunders, much of the success by the hostile forces was as the result of poor training, poor marksmanship, and poor fire discipline on the part of the troopers. Stuck cartridge cases had little to do with it.
 
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1. If so, were knife blades that weak back then?
A better question would be "Were GOOD knife blades that weak back then?"

Given what the average cavalry trooper made a month, how good of a knife could he afford?

On what basis do you judge 20th century firearms technology, a Sig P-210 or a Jennings .25?

BTW - I've got a Bundeswehr pocket knife that I keep in my gun box for cutting cleaning patches, etc. I once broke the tip off trying to pry open a PLASTIC ammo box.
 
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Custer "underestimated" and failed to "understand" his enemy's culture and motivation. This may sound like an obvious understatement; and it is, but it is part of a fundamental recipe for failure that has been acted out repeatedly throughout history, including, of course, by our own nation. And it seems that it does not matter how much more fire power those operating under hubris have, if they press on in this blindness and contempt for their enemy. "Pride comes before destruction, and a haughty spirit before a fall."
 
Of a more telling question without any other social comment: What changes did the Custer Battle make in Military Officer instruction?
How often are losses dissected and examined at a major level?
 
To reinforce what smazingflapjack said, the forces involved in the summer campaign of 1876 simply seem not to have expected organized resistance or large-scale battles.

It is instructional to look at another part of the campaign, the battle that General Crook fought the week before the LBH against warriors from the same village on the Rosebud. This was a very different fight, an almost set-piece battle initiated by the Indians. Crook managed to maintain control of all his units, and despite some tense moments, infantry and cavalry were able to always support each other in such a way that ultimately the Indians were the ones to withdraw. Since Crook kept the battlefield, he could claim victory, but despite relatively low casualties he broke off his advance and marched back to resupply and regroup, effectively dropping out of the campaign for several weeks and thus turning the Rosebud into a strategic victory for the Indians.

Custer, who did not have the crucial intel about Crook's fight (which might have given him pause) likewise does not appear to have expected a battle to the death. He seems to have been focussed on taking control of the village, to prevent the Indian civilians from getting away, by drawing the warriors south to Reno's attack. That worked perfectly. But then Custer lost his momentum hanging around the ridge for an hour waiting for Benteen.

By that time, Custer's batallion had taken very few losses. There is simply nothing indicating that remounting and marching back the route the right wing had come, over Calhoun Hill and Nye-Cartwright Ridge toward Weir Point, would have met much if any resistance at all. But apparently Custer saw no need for that and no existential threat.

By the time he must have realized that his problem was no longer the Indians getting away, but his command getting away, things had gone sideways beyond repair.
 
By the time he must have realized that his problem was no longer the Indians getting away, but his command getting away, things had gone sideways beyond repair.
Custer did to himself at Little Big Horn what Col. Ichiki did to himself on Guadalcanal. He let poor/no intelligence lull him into a false sense of security, if not superiority until he, against advice, walked into a blast furnace and was obliterated along with his command.
 
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Custer, Custer, Custer. George Custer is/was a perfect example of how good PR can make a terrible military leader into a pop superstar. Custer's problem was that he believed his own PR and was never in a position to be seriously militarily contested until 1876.
 
I assumed my question was pretty straightforward. . . . Never assume.
At Custer's last battle enlisted cavalry soldiers were armed with a rifle and revolver. With how much ammunition for each firearm did each soldier begin the battle?
 
My impression is that the "Indians" used the human wave tactic that has been employed in later wars; very effectively in the Viet Nam War.

From what I recall of the book (and it's been a while since I last read it) the indians generally didn't believe in large attacks and sacrificing men to take a position. There were stories mentioned where just a few Cavalry men circled the wagons and fought off a much larger indian force. This happened largely because the indians weren't really in it to take ground, and in many cases they were simply out to "count coup" which is to commit an act of bravery...not necessarily to kill anyone or storm a defensive position. Most of the time when they attacked indians, the indians ran.

What made this battle different from the "normal" indian battle was this group was basically the hardest of the hard indians who refused to live on a reservation. They were experienced and tough indian fighters who had quite simply had enough. They didn't run when attacked.

Making the situation even worse was that Custers campaign was supposed to have taken place in the late winter, when the indians would have been holed up in their teepees and their horses weakened by the long winter. Several delays pushed the campaign back until the summer, by which time every indian and horse was well fed and conditioned.

I recall that at the Little Bighorn the 7th cav became separated into smaller groups, lines of communication were difficult to maintain, at least one officer was too drunk to command his troops, one officer hated Custer so much that he left him to his own fate rather than try to reinforce him, the troops were generally very inexperienced, and when they fell back to defensive positions the indians just lobbed arrow and gun volleys into them all night.

The "Terrible Glory" book said that as one group of 7th Cav lay circled in a defensive position at night, they could hear the indians singing and torturing the American wounded in the valley below. All the while they had arrows landing amongst them and indians trying to test the perimeter.

Another haunting image came from the letters of an officer sent from the river to find and reinforce the 7th. That unit approached a valley and was curious as to why the 7th looked so ragged through their looking glass. The troops they saw in the distance weren't in formation, and they had a strange mix of uniforms and gear. As it turns out, they weren't looking at the 7th cav, they were looking at hundreds of indians wearing pieces of uniforms they had stripped from the dead cavalrymen.

It was a desperate place to be.
 
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Anyone knowledgeable about Custer knows he was no hero. His ego forced the miscalculation at the Little Bighorn and he possessed a reputation as an arrogant jerk. Custer was court martialed twice and finished last in his class at West Point. He got what he gave in his demise despite how much ammo he and his men used. Heck, the Lakota had better weapons than the 7th.
 
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I assumed my question was pretty straightforward. . . . Never assume.

No chance. Not with Custer. Just like with bears and the JFK assassination. All we need is an excuse.... :D

PS: Never EVER ask a straightforward question related even remotely to the causes of the Civil War. ;)
 
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You have encouraged responses from some very knowledgeable individuals. I thank you, picked up some information I had been seeking for many years. I have read at least 7 different books on Custer and his bride and find each of us picks some aspects that interest us.
I remember one author who quoted Indians as saying many of Custer's men went crazy and killed themselves.

Another author talks abut a reward being offered to the man who shot Custer, the tribes needed the money, they did not know who shot Custer and they figured the whites would just kill him when he came forward. One bunch drew straws and one man was picked to admits he killed Custer. The Indians felt that Custer was one of the first to dye and the circumstances they believed were related to the folks who offered the reward. They did not kill him, and the money was distributed among some of the Indians.

I believe Custer could have been our next president had he lived through the Little Big Horn.
 
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You have encouraged responses from some very knowledgeable individuals. I thank you, picked up some information I had been seeking for many years. I have read at least 7 different books on Custer and his bride and find each of us picks some aspects that interest us.
I remember one author who quoted Indians as saying many of Custer's men went crazy and killed themselves.

Another author talks abut a reward being offered to the man who shot Custer, the tribes needed the money, they did not know who shot Custer and they figured the whites would just kill him when he came forward. One bunch drew straws and one man was picked to admits he killed Custer. The Indians felt that Custer was one of the first to dye and the circumstances they believed were related to the folks who offered the reward. They did not kill him, and the money was distributed among some of the Indians.

I believe Custer could have been our next president had he lived through the Little Big Horn.

He had aspirations of being the Democratic Nominee. He needed some big wins with the Indian wars to further his cause, possibly influencing his poor judgment and contributing to the rout.
 
I haven't studied this in long time, so I'll just make some general observations.

Even after the Ferguson massacre, the Army still believed that the long range fire power of the 45-70 was a more tactical advantage than the firepower of a short range lever action. When Fort Kearny was hiring Pawnee scouts (The Pawnee were enemies of the Sioux) the Pawnees counter offered for less pay but they would only accept if they got Winchesters. So the troops had Springfields and the scouts had lever actions.

Custer's battlefield experience in the War of Aggression taught him that outnumbered Calvary troops could prevail by surprising the enemy in an unanticipated charge. The Army's job was to put the Native Americans back on the reservation. They were not fighting a normal war, it was more of a policing action. As such the Native Americans rarely attacked troops unless they were in small groups of 2 or 3 and concentrated on robbing and killing homesteaders (the Ferguson massacre being the exemption). The game plan was always the same, when the troops encountered an Native American village the warriors fought long enough for the women and children to escape and then rode off. This amounted to a failure of the pursuing troop's mission.

So Custer never thought for one moment that the Native Americans were going to wage a military style battle in Wyoming. His objective was to try and catch the fleeing tribe, round them up and force them back to the reservation.

Sort of like like two policeman chasing a bad guy, rounding a corner and finding 100 bad guys waiting for them.

The books are always about how many mistakes Custard made. Haven't found a book yet that really discusses how the various Native American Tribes came together and developed a battle plan out of a West Point training manual.
 
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