The Battle of the Coral Sea

[GaryS]

One of the problems Australia had was that most of their military age men were fighting in North Africa or otherwise engaged in the European War.

A successful Japanese invasion of Australia at the least would have made the Pacific War much longer, although it's likely it would have resulted in a negotiated piece on the Japanese terms.

The Australians have been one of our best allies ever since WW II. Maybe this is part of the reason.

I do not doubt you got the correct answer on your test in 1972, the Battle of the Coral Sea. Midway is better known in this country but it was not the first.

Early in 1942 our goal was keeping Australia available to amass troops and equipment on for the eventual push north. The following fight over Guadalcanal was to prevent the Japanese bombing the Liberty Ships and transports headed to Australia. They would not have had enough fuel to sail from the USA to Australia if they had to stay out of range of bombers flying off Guadalcanal and we had no allies in Central or South America that would allow use of their ports.

While in the USA the Battle of the Coral Sea is mostly only remembered by WWII buffs it is a national holiday in Australia. They appreciate those troop transports being turned around.

 

[Dennis The B]

One of the problems Australia had was that most of their military age men were fighting in North Africa or otherwise engaged in the European War.

A successful Japanese invasion of Australia at the least would have made the Pacific War much longer, although it's likely it would have resulted in a negotiated piece on the Japanese terms.

The Australians have been one of our best allies ever since WW II. Maybe this is part of the reason.

Part of the problem with any Japanese invasion of Australia, was the ability of the Japanese to hold on to what they conquered. The Japanese had real problems with the Philippines, and the guerilla war by Americans and Filipinos. Australia would have been a huge logistical problem. The coast line is so large, that the Japanese couldn't defend it, and a lot of the Australians would have retreated inland, creating a war that would have bled the Japanese nearly dry.

One of the few in the Japanese hierarchy who recognized the limits on Japanese conquering power, was Admiral Yamamoto.

The Japanese were amazingly ignorant of the world outside of east Asia. They badly underestimated the anger of the Americans after Pearl Harbor, and failed to recognize the power of American industry.

Their strategy of negotiated peace was poorly planned, and even more poorly executed.

 

[GaryS]

Outside of the Philippines, the Japanese strategy of brutal oppression worked well for the. Holding the coast of Australia would have likely been sufficient to deny Australia to the allies for much of the war.

Yamamoto had a good understanding of America and Americans. Certainly much better than most of the Japanese military command. That alone made killing him a good idea, even without the revenge factor for Pearl Harbor.

We also shouldn't forget the contribution of the submarine service to the defeat of Japan. Ultimately, unrestricted submarine warfare worked much better for the Allies than it did for Germany.

Part of the problem with any Japanese invasion of Australia, was the ability of the Japanese to hold on to what they conquered. The Japanese had real problems with the Philippines, and the guerilla war by Americans and Filipinos. Australia would have been a huge logistical problem. The coast line is so large, that the Japanese couldn't defend it, and a lot of the Australians would have retreated inland, creating a war that would have bled the Japanese nearly dry.

One of the few in the Japanese hierarchy who recognized the limits on Japanese conquering power, was Admiral Yamamoto.

The Japanese were amazingly ignorant of the world outside of east Asia. They badly underestimated the anger of the Americans after Pearl Harbor, and failed to recognize the power of American industry.

Their strategy of negotiated peace was poorly planned, and even more poorly executed.

 

[cmort666]

One of the few in the Japanese hierarchy who recognized the limits on Japanese conquering power, was Admiral Yamamoto.

The Japanese were amazingly ignorant of the world outside of east Asia. They badly underestimated the anger of the Americans after Pearl Harbor, and failed to recognize the power of American industry.

Their strategy of negotiated peace was poorly planned, and even more poorly executed.

Ignorance and obscurantism were pretty much cardinal virtues in the Imperial Japanese Army. Before the war, most army officers never got farther away from Japan than Manchuria.

Navy officers were much better informed about the world, having for a long time, close ties to the Royal Navy. The IJN was practically a child of the RN, and maintained a lot of its traditions.

Even the IJN officers who favored war, had a better appreciation for what war would REALLY entail. That's why the IJN was FAR more advanced technologically than the IJA.

At the start of the war, the Japanese Navy had the best shipboard fighter and the best torpedoes in the world. The Japanese Army had... really good bayonets.

The best thing that could have happened for the Japanese would have been for Yamamoto to have put down the Tokyo coup, then seized power in his own coup. Japan probably would have come to some kind of mutually tolerable agreement on China and sat out the greater war like Spain, keeping all of her possessions.

Of course life would be a lot worse for the average Japanese today (nevermind Koreans and Taiwanese), but a lot fewer people would have died, at least in Asia. With unlimited Japanese (and American) support, Chiang might have defeated Mao.

 

[GaryS]

For those of you who have the Military History Channel available, they will be showing "The Last Stand of The Tin Can Sailors" at 6:00PM EST.

 

[muddocktor]

Another big plus that the Allies had going for them after Coral Sea was the fact that while the Japanese lost just 1 small carrier (Shoho), they also had one large carrier (Shokaku) severely damaged and another (Zuikaku) lost the greatest majority of it's aircraft and pilots along with Shokaku's air groups. That kept both carriers from participating in the Battle of Midway and helped even the odds for the US enormously, 3 carriers to 4 carriers instead of 6 Japanese carriers against 3 US carriers. Midway might have been a disaster for the US if those 2 fleet carriers hadn't been taken out of the fight by Coral Sea.

The Japanese scored a tactical victory at Coral Sea, in that they lost fewer ships. However, it was a strategic victory for the U.S., because the Japanese had to literally reverse course for troop carrying ships to the Solomon Islands and New Guinea areas; it changed their strategic aims in that area, and enabled the U.S. to invade the Solomon Islands at Guadalcanal in August.

U.S.S. Yorktown was severely damaged, but ship repair crews at Pearl Harbor turned her around in time for her service at Midway.

Admiral Chester Nimitz had been charged by President Roosevelt to "get out to Pearl Harbor, and not come home until we've won".

Guadalcanal was an iffy campaign for months, owed in no small part to miscues by Admiral Robert Ghormley, and his support of the Marines, and the Navy's underestimation of the Japanese Navy's surface fleet.

 

[Cardboard_killer]

By the time of the later battles, the USN and USMC had not only better airplanes, they had better pilots.

Yes, that's why I stated "but the difference in pilot skill level (mostly) and plane superiority won the day." Meaning that the victory had more to do with better trained pilots than better air planes. Although the radar may have been the deciding factor as better trained pilots don't do you any good if you don't intercept the enemy.

In "defense" of the Japanese, they lacked aviation fuel to train their pilots, and fuel oil to maneuver the carriers to train for carrier operations. The same thing happened to the Germans, who at least managed to keep up technologically with the allies, unlike the Japanese. (BTW, I read an interesting tidbit the other day: 1% of fighter pilots in WW2 were responsible for 50% of the kills, leaving the remaining 99% responsible for the other 50% of the kills).

I'll also say this in defense of the Japanese--as unsound as their WW2 strategy was, it was still better thought out than Germany's, which amounted to keep attacking the next guy until you run out of nations to attack.

 

[cmort666]

I'll also say this in defense of the Japanese--as unsound as their WW2 strategy was, it was still better thought out than Germany's, which amounted to keep attacking the next guy until you run out of nations to attack.

On the other hand, the Japanese convinced themselves (contrary to over a hundred years of history) that if they just poked the tiger in the butt with a barbeque fork hard enough, it'd just roll over and let you scratch it's belly.

Attacking the British and the Dutch possibly had some rationale, in that they were otherwise occupied. Attacking the United States was borne of pure self-imposed delusion, and Yamamoto knew it. The imperial system of Japan was doomed when the first bomb left the first aircraft at Pearl Harbor. The Bataan Death March ensured that there would be not one iota of mercy until Japan was utterly crushed.

 

[Dennis The B]

On the other hand, the Japanese convinced themselves (contrary to over a hundred years of history) that if they just poked the tiger in the butt with a barbeque fork hard enough, it'd just roll over and let you scratch it's belly.

Attacking the British and the Dutch possibly had some rationale, in that they were otherwise occupied. Attacking the United States was borne of pure self-imposed delusion, and Yamamoto knew it. The imperial system of Japan was doomed when the first bomb left the first aircraft at Pearl Harbor. The Bataan Death March ensured that there would be not one iota of mercy until Japan was utterly crushed.

The Japanese until later in 1941, actually had some options as to their imperial expansion. The Japanese had already expanded their "beach head" in Manchuria, which could provide a launch point against Siberia.

In the early part of Operation Barbarossa, the German superiority of strength would have made one believe that the Soviet Union's collapse was imminent. The Wehrmacht was knocking on Moscow's door, and this would have presented the Japanese the opportunity to expand into Siberia, with the defeat of the Soviets. Siberia already had established Soviet industry, and resistance would have been much weaker. The Soviets couldn't wage a "two front" war.

At least, that's one of the theories. Whether the Japanese could have invaded Siberia, is anyone's guess. However, if the Japanese could have prevailed in northeastern Asia, they wouldn't have invaded Singapore, Australia, etc., eliminating a naval campaign.

Operation Barbarossa was doomed, in no small part, due to poor timing; let alone the ultimate resistance of the Soviets.

The Japanese, were also not as skilled in jungle fighting as the Allies were led to believe. They suffered from poorly designed war materiels, uniforms, and the equivalent to our "web gear". The leather literally fell apart, and ammunition was poorly packed, lacking waterproofing. Singapore fell, not from superior Japanese tactics, but from British incompetence in defending Singapore from the landward side.

 

[the ringo kid]

For those of you who have the Military History Channel available, they will be showing "The Last Stand of The Tin Can Sailors" at 6:00PM EST.

I think its on dvd too? I almost picked it up at WM--and could swear that one mentioned--was part of the set.

 

[the ringo kid]

The Japanese until later in 1941, actually had some options as to their imperial expansion. The Japanese had already expanded their "beach head" in Manchuria, which could provide a launch point against Siberia.

In the early part of Operation Barbarossa, the German superiority of strength would have made one believe that the Soviet Union's collapse was imminent. The Wehrmacht was knocking on Moscow's door, and this would have presented the Japanese the opportunity to expand into Siberia, with the defeat of the Soviets. Siberia already had established Soviet industry, and resistance would have been much weaker. The Soviets couldn't wage a "two front" war.

At least, that's one of the theories. Whether the Japanese could have invaded Siberia, is anyone's guess. However, if the Japanese could have prevailed in northeastern Asia, they wouldn't have invaded Singapore, Australia, etc., eliminating a naval campaign.

Operation Barbarossa was doomed, in no small part, due to poor timing; let alone the ultimate resistance of the Soviets.

The Japanese, were also not as skilled in jungle fighting as the Allies were led to believe. They suffered from poorly designed war materiels, uniforms, and the equivalent to our "web gear". The leather literally fell apart, and ammunition was poorly packed, lacking waterproofing. Singapore fell, not from superior Japanese tactics, but from British incompetence in defending Singapore from the landward side.

Then the Japanese "ran into" Georgi Zhukov-who stopped them from further fight-picking with soldiers of the Soviet Union. He gave the IJA a very bloody nose--which made them think twice about picking fights with the Soviets.

 

[cmort666]

Then the Japanese "ran into" Georgi Zhukov-who stopped them from further fight-picking with soldiers of the Soviet Union. He gave the IJA a very bloody nose--which made them think twice about picking fights with the Soviets.

If I'm not mistaken, they tried again in '44, this time getting stomped by the Mongolian People's Army. After that, they threw in the towel for good.

To give you an idea of the lunacy of some in the Japanese military, they actually believed in 1945 that the Soviet could be talked into switching sides and fighting on their side against the United States. Stupidity like that simply can't be fixed by anything but napalm... or a rope around the neck.

 

[GaryS]

When was this? As I recall, Zhukov spent a lot of time defending against the Germans at Leningrad, Kursk, and so on. I think he also lead the Russian Army into Berlin in 1945, thus ending the war in Europe.

I also remember that the Russian bravely waited until after the Atomic bombs were dropped on Japan to declare war on Japan.

Mongolian People's Army? Don't you mean 1st Mongolian Cavalry, U.S. Navy?

Then the Japanese "ran into" Georgi Zhukov-who stopped them from further fight-picking with soldiers of the Soviet Union. He gave the IJA a very bloody nose--which made them think twice about picking fights with the Soviets.

 

[fordson]

Nomonhan, August 1939. Japan got into a border dispute with the Soviets in the outer reaches of the Mongolia-Manchurian border, near Lake Buir Nor and the village (if you can call it that) of Nomonhan. The Soviets attacked with air power and armor; the Japanese with bayonets. Zhukov was in command of the Red Army.

 

[GaryS]

Ahhh, thanks. I read that as happening in 1944.

Nomonhan, August 1939. Japan got into a border dispute with the Soviets in the outer reaches of the Mongolia-Manchurian border, near Lake Buir Nor and the village (if you can call it that) of Nomonhan. The Soviets attacked with air power and armor; the Japanese with bayonets. Zhukov was in command of the Red Army.

 

[MCorps0311]

Great photos of the battle!

 

[cmort666]

Ahhh, thanks. I read that as happening in 1944.

As I recall, the Japanese had a second go at it in 1944. They got stomped by the Mongolian People's Army, who by that time were better equipped than the Kwantung Army.

In 1945, the Soviets went through the Kwantung Army like **** through a goose. All of their best troops and equipment had been stripped away and sent to be destroyed in the Pacific. They were utterly destroyed and thousands of Japanese colonists displaced or killed. As with German POWs, a big chunk of the Japanese POWs never made it home.

 

[zzzippper]

I served on the USS Johnston (DDD821) which was named after the USS Johnston (DD557). 557 was instrumental in protecting the landing force at the Coral Sea. For more details of the heroic action of the 557 before she was sunk in battle search "Taffy 3".

Three destroyers and four smaller destroyer escorts had been tasked to protect the escort carriers from aircraft and submarines. The three Fletcher-class destroyers—affectionately nicknamed "tin cans" because they lacked armor—were fast enough to keep up with a fast carrier task force. Each had five single 5 in (127 mm) guns and light antiaircraft guns which were not designed to take on armored warships. Only their ten 21 in (530 mm) Mark-15 torpedoes—housed in two swiveling five-tube launchers amidships—posed a serious threat to battleships and cruisers. Destroyer escorts like Samuel B. Roberts were even smaller and slower, since they had been designed to protect slow freighter convoys against submarines.

After laying down smoke to hide the carriers from Japanese gunners, they were soon making desperate torpedo runs. The ship profiles and aggressiveness caused the Japanese to think they were cruisers and full-sized destroyers. Their lack of armor tended to aid clean penetration of armor-piercing rounds before Japanese gunners switched to high-explosive (HE) shells, which caused much more extensive damage. Their speed and agility enabled some ships to dodge shellfire completely before launching torpedoes. Effective damage control and redundancy in propulsion and power systems kept them running and fighting even after absorbing dozens of hits before sinking, although the decks would be littered with the dead and seriously wounded.

USS Johnston (DD557)

At 0700, Commander Ernest E. Evans (half Cherokee and one quarter Creek) of the destroyer Johnston, in response to incoming shell fire bracketing carriers of the group he was escorting, began laying down a protective smokescreen and zigzagging. At about 0710, Gunnery Officer Robert Hagen began firing at the closest attackers, then at a range of 18,000 yards (16,000 m) and registered several hits on the leading heavy cruisers. The Japanese targeted Johnston and soon shell splashes were bracketing the ship. In response and without consulting with his commanders, Evans ordered Johnston to "flank speed, full left rudder", beginning an action that would earn him the Medal of Honor. Johnston, still making smoke and zigzagging, accelerated to flank speed towards the Japanese.

Johnston pressed its attack, firing more than two hundred shells as it followed an evasive course through moderate swells, making it a difficult target. Johnston closed to within maximum torpedo range, and at 9,000 yards (8,200 m) she fired a full salvo of ten torpedoes.[11] At 0724, two or three struck, blowing the bow off Kumano. Minutes later, at 0733, Kongō was forced to turn away north to avoid four torpedoes. The heavy cruiser Suzuya, suffering damage from air attacks, was also taken out of the fight, as she stopped to assist Kumano. The effect of Johnston's attack was to generate confusion in the minds of the Japanese commanders, who thought they were being engaged by American cruisers. Evans then reversed course and, under cover of his smoke screen, opened the range between his ship and the enemy.

At 0730, three 14 in (360 mm) shells from the battleship Kongō, at a range of 7 nmi (8.1 mi; 13 km), passed through the deck of Johnston and into her portside engine room, cutting the destroyer's speed in half to 17 kn (20 mph; 31 km/h) and disrupting electric power to her aft gun mounts. Moments later, three 6 in (150 mm) shells — possibly from Yamato — struck Johnston's bridge, causing numerous casualties and severing the fingers of Commander Evans's left hand. The ship was mangled badly, with dead and dying sailors strewn across her bloody decks—but Johnston did not sink. Her stores of fuel had been seriously depleted before the battle, saving her from a catastrophic explosion. The ship found sanctuary in rain squalls, where the crew had time to repair damage, restoring power to two of the three aft gun mounts. Johnston's search radar was destroyed, toppled to the deck in a tangled mess. The fire control radar was damaged, but was quickly returned to service. Only a few minutes were required to bring Johnston's main battery and radar online, and from its hidden position in the rain, Johnston fired several dozen rounds at a destroyer leader at 10,000 yards (9,100 m) (beginning at approximately 0735). Fire was then shifted to the cruisers approaching from the east. Several dozen more rounds were fired at the closest target at 11,000 yards (10,000 m).

As Johnston continued its course away from the Japanese, it came upon the charging screening force, led by the damaged Hoel. Evans then had Johnston rejoin the attack to provide gun support to Commander Thomas' small squadron on their torpedo run. Attacking Tone, the leading heavy cruiser to the east of the formation, Johnston closed to 6,000 yards (5,500 m), now firing with reduced efficiency due to her lost SC radar, yet still registering many hits.

During the battle, Evans engaged in several duels with much larger Japanese opponents. At 0820, emerging through smoke and rain squalls, Johnston was confronted by Kongō, a 36,600-ton battleship. Johnston fired at least 40 rounds, and more than 15 hits on the battleship's superstructure were observed. Johnston reversed course and disappeared in the smoke, avoiding Kongō's 14-inch return fire. Responding at 0830, Johnston bore down on a huge cruiser firing at the helpless Gambier Bay, then closed to 6,000 yards (5,500 m) and fired for ten minutes at a heavier and better-armed opponent, possibly Haguro, scoring numerous hits.

At 0840, a much more pressing target appeared astern. A formation of seven Japanese destroyers in two columns was closing in to attack the carriers. Reversing course to intercept, Evans attempted to pass in front of the formation, crossing the "T", a classical naval maneuver which would have put the force being "crossed" at a great disadvantage. Evans ordered Johnston's guns to fire on this new threat. The Japanese destroyers returned fire, striking Johnston several times. Perhaps seeing his disadvantage, the commander of the lead destroyer turned away to the west. From as close as 7,000 yards (6,400 m), Hagen fired and scored a dozen hits on the destroyer leader before it veered off. He shifted fire to the next destroyer in line, scoring five hits before it too turned away. Amazingly, the entire squadron turned west to avoid Johnston's fire. At 0920, these destroyers finally managed to fire their torpedoes from extreme range, 10,500 yd (9,600 m). Several torpedoes were detonated by strafing aircraft or defensive fire from the carriers, and the rest failed to strike a target.

Now the Japanese and American ships were intertwined in a confused jumble. Gambier Bay and Hoel were sinking. Finding targets was not difficult. After 0900, with Hoel and Samuel B. Roberts out of the fight, the crippled Johnston was an easy target. Fighting with all she had, she exchanged fire with four cruisers and numerous destroyers.

Johnston continued to take hits from the Japanese, which knocked out the number one gun mount, killing many men. By 0920, forced from the bridge by exploding ammunition, Evans was commanding the ship from the stern by shouting orders down to men manually operating the rudder. Shell fire knocked out the remaining engine, leaving Johnston dead in the water at 0940. As her attackers gathered around the vulnerable ship, they concentrated fire on her rather than the fleeing carriers. Johnston was hit so many times that one survivor recalled "they couldn't patch holes fast enough to keep her afloat."

At 0945, Evans finally gave the order to abandon ship. Johnston sank 25 minutes later with 186 of her crew. Evans abandoned ship with his crew, but was never seen again. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. However, it was the Japanese themselves who first recognized Johnston's incredible actions that day: As a Japanese destroyer cruised slowly by, Robert Billie and several other crewmen watched as her captain saluted the sinking Johnston.
--
Roger

Evans, while very brave, posthumously caught a lot of heat from the other DD and DE skippers. His dashing off alone to face the Japs was brave but contrary to the Navy's doctrine of an organized coordinated attack. It can be argued both ways and the outcome was positive but the sum of the parts would have been stronger than individual ships. An additional point to consider is that the Japanese were stressed and tired after days straight of being at battle stations. The manner of the confused attack may have contributed to their decision to withdraw. The fighters from the CVEs were also thought to be from Halsey's carriers.

 

[zzzippper]

Back to the Coral Sea battle. Adm. King and his staff in Washington did not believe the intel that was coming out of Nimitz' staff at Pearl Harbor and ordered the fleet moved away from the area. Nimitz basically lied to King about the location of the fleet and so was in position to face the Japanese. They then had to beat feet back to Pearl to get ready for the battle of Midway which was even more important tactically but probably not as important strategically. The Coral Sea kept Australia in the war and the shipping lanes open.

 

[the ringo kid]

If I'm not mistaken, they tried again in '44, this time getting stomped by the Mongolian People's Army. After that, they threw in the towel for good.

To give you an idea of the lunacy of some in the Japanese military, they actually believed in 1945 that the Soviet could be talked into switching sides and fighting on their side against the United States. Stupidity like that simply can't be fixed by anything but napalm... or a rope around the neck.

I think you are correct on the IJA trying again. I seem to remember reading something on it but-many years ago.