And for today's historical-strategic musings:
I just watched a presentation about the military situation in Eastern Ukraine by a colonel from the Austrian military academy. Only in German, so I won't link it here.
An interesting part of the analysis was a comparison he drew between the developing battle for the Donbas salient, and the Battle of Kursk which was fought in 1943 not very far from there, just to the north of Charkiv.
One important point is that the Germans did not lose that battle. At the time when Hitler aborted the operation to encircle the salient, German forces were still advancing. In fact, Manstein, commanding the southern pincer, opposed the decision to stop and after the war claimed victory was near, not considered realistic by historians. But the lesson here is that if you're the intended victim in an encirclement battle, you don't necessarily have to defeat the encircler, you just have to prevent him from succeeding.
The Austrian colonel identified three main factors that allowed the Red Army to bog down the German advances. For each, he pointed out that today they describe the Ukrainians' posture versus the Russians:
1. Information. Thanks to breaking the Enigma codes with help from the British, the Soviets were listening to the Germans and knew what was coming when and where. We've talked here about Ukraine's use of information technology and intelligence support.
2. Preparation. The Soviets anticipated the German offensive and created multiple belts of field fortifications in the weeks before. The Ukrainians anticipated a war for the Donbas since 2014, and the Donbas front is actually much better prepared for a defense in depth that Kyiv was.
3. Motivation. In this the Ukrainians actually have an edge over the Red Army in 1943. They show a dedication to fight rarely seen on the modern battlefield. Unlike Soviet soldiers, they don't need to be more afraid of their political commissar than of the enemy to fight.
It needs the sobering remainder that Kursk, even though ultimately a success for the Red Army, was a disaster in terms of personnel and material. Losses were huge. In fact, Soviet propaganda inflated the legend of Prokhorovka, supposedly the greatest tank battle ever, to cover up devastating Russian tank losses; so they just invented equally large losses for the Germans.
So while there is hope in history for Ukraine, it will not be easy.