Watchdog mentioned the Gatling guns and how the might have changed the tide of the battle. I am of the opinion that the only way the could have helped is the fact they are so heavy and cumbersome that they would have slowed Custer and the battle may not have taken place. As to their use in defense of Custer I can see little of any change in the outcome. The Indians did not walk in rows upright to Custer. They hid in the grass and crawled up ravines on their bellies and from below, a type of attack that would render the Gatling near useless. They came from many directions as well so the chances of hitting even one Indian per magazine would have been highly unlikely. Had this been the Civil War where most battles started with a long line of men marching towards you, then the Gatling would be influential in the outcome but not the way the Custer battle played out IMO.
I agree their greatest value would have been in slowing Custer's rush to the scene of his demise - possibly allowing the natives to withdraw rather than fight.
Otherwise, I disagree.
The role of the gatling gun was the same as the role of the machine gun not too long after. As late as WWII the tactical doctrine against both fixed positions and in open country called for machine guns to pin the enemy in place while rifleman broke down the enemy. That was little changed from the waning days of the civil war where the combination of the Gatling gun and the rifled musket made Napoleonic tactics obsolete.
In that regard, the Gatling gun would have been extremely useful at LBH, assuming Custer could have established a suitable defensive perimeter.
If you walk the battle field and analyze the terrain from a small unit commander's perspective, and with an eye to the weapons of the day you realize a coupe things:
1) The Reno/Benteen position was the only defensible terrain in the area. It was well chosen and while others have condemned Reno for his actions, his actions are the only thing that saved his command. Had he attempted to advance to support Custer, he'd have been wiped out, and it would have been a waste as he could not have covered the 2 mile distance under fire soon enough to make a difference, and he'd have to cross the same terrain Custer was unable to cross to withdraw from LSH.
The steep slope down to the creek on the west side and the steep draw to the south left those areas well protected as attacking uphill was extremely hazardous. To the east there was 600 plus yards of very open, gently sloping terrain that would have made any kind of charge non survivable. Similarly, to the north was 600 or so yards of upward sloping terrain that was also devoid of cover. The command took some long range sniper rounds from a Sharps on the hill top, but otherwise, the area was easy to defend with troops carrying .45-70 Springfield carbines with an effective range of about 400 yards.
2) Last Stand Hill became progressively less defensible.
Initially it wasn't a bad position as the native americans came up a draw from the river and then engaged the hill and the skirmishers on the ridge leading to the hill from Greasy Grass Ridge.
Basically, Greasy Grass ridge ran west to east south of LSH, and intersected the ridge leading to the hill about 800 yards south east of LST. The ranges varied from about 250 yards to 700 yards. This was well beyond the effective range of the lever action rifles used by the natives (150 yards) and gave the initial advantage to the skirmishers on the ridge and the defenders on the hill.
The problem was that the natives also came up a draw to the east paralleling the ridge with several positions with ranges of 120-150 yards, which caused the skirmishers to have to fall back to the hill.
Even after the skirmishers fell back, and the natives closed the range to the hill via another draw to the southwest to around 300 yards, the fire from the natives was still comparatively ineffective, while the fire from the cavalry troops was not.
However, once the skirmishers fell back from the ridge leading from the top of the draw to last stand hill, it enabled the natives to obtain positions behind a low ridge to the northwest of LSH. The defilade is very slight, but sufficient and the ranges were again around 120-150 yards which forced the defenders to stay on the southwest slope of LSH.
Ultimately, with depleted numbers, diminishing numbers of functional weapons (the copper cased ammo tended to stick in black powder fouled chambers after extended firing, and had to be driver out with a ram rod), it was inevitable that they would not be able to resist a charge from either the northwest (only 120-150 yards), or from the southwest.
However...Gatling guns employed at that point could have suppressed those charges, and possibly could have added enough support to enable a withdrawl to the Reno/Benteen position.
Additionally, had Reno been equipped with Gatling guns, it's likely he could have held his position at the peak of his advance on the village from the south, rather than having to fall back into the woods and across the river to his final position. It's also probable that under covering fire from Gatling guns he could have continued the advance, as planned, even against superior numbers of warriors.
At a minimum, either way, he would have kept a significant number of warriors pinned in the south, and would have kept the focus on the battle in the south, giving Custer's planned envelopment of the village from the north greater chance of success.
